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I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 1995, Governor Lawton Chiles signed into law landmark private property rights legislation enacted during the 1995
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Regular Session of the Florida Legislature.' The measure includes a
new cause of action providing judicial relief to landowners who suffer
inordinate burdens on the use of their land and a new nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing procedure promoting compromise solu2
tions for disputes between landowners and regulators.
The legislation concluded three years of contentious debate over the
appropriate means to give landowners protection for the use of their
property beyond the constitutional guarantee against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.3 The new statute has stirred fears that it will empty the public purse and roll back
decades of work in environmental protection and growth management, as well as countervailing concerns among landowners that it will
not protect them from the proliferation of regulations that impede
4
their efforts to put their land to productive use.
If properly implemented and applied, the measure will have none of
the above effects. The legislation grants important new rights and
remedies to landowners while maintaining existing environmental protection and growth management programs. It protects landowners
against some regulatory actions which do not rise to the level of a
taking, but it is more limited in scope than property rights legislation
considered in Florida in recent years.' Perhaps most importantly, the
measure is intended to reform the way government does business with
landowners. 6 The legislation provides a measured response to a pressing and emotional issue and strikes a balance between conflicting,
but equally valid, public and private interests.
II.

BACKGROUND

The subject of private property rights is not new in Florida. From
the beginning of the period of environmental activism by the Florida
Legislature in the early 1970s, the issue of legal protections for private
property rights has generated much legislative activity. These efforts
have increased in recent years due to the controversies which have attended the implementation of Florida's growth management programs. The trend in Florida to extend greater protection to private

1. FLA. STAT. § 70 (1995).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
4. Larry Kaplow, Panel OK's Compromise on Property Rights Bill, PAum BEACH POST,
Apr. 20, 1995, at A9.
5. Larry Kaplow, Property Rights Bill Readied, PALm BEAcH POST, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al.
6. Kaplow, supra note 4, at A9.
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property rights reflects national developments, both in statehouses
and in the Congress. 7
A.

The 1993 Regular Session of the Legislature

Although the public policy argument regarding increased protection
of private property rights has been simmering for several years, it was
only in 1993 that the Legislature considered the matter ripe for legislative attention. A bill was introduced into the Florida House of Representatives which would have created a cause of action by which a
landowner could obtain a judicial order requiring condemnation of
his property. The order would apply to any governmental entity that
imposed a restriction which "severely limited the practical use of the
property," unless the restriction was an exercise of the police power to
prohibit a use that was "noxious in fact" or to prevent "a demonstrable harm to public health and safety." 8 The court could have awarded
compensation to a prevailing landowner.
Significantly, the bill would have established a presumption that a
"severe limitation" on the practical use of an owner's land occurs
when its fair market value is reduced by forty percent from the uses
permitted at the time the owner acquired title or on July 1, 1985,
whichever was later.9 The bill was approved by the House Judiciary
0
Committee but died on the House calendar.
Instead, the Legislature enacted a measure which would have created the Study Commission on Inverse Condemnation to explore and
recommend new remedies to protect landowners against the effects of
regulation."I Governor Chiles vetoed the measure; he objected to both
7. Since 1991, at least 19 states have enacted property rights legislation. See ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANt. §§ 9-462.02, 9-500.12, 9-500.13, 11-810, 11-811, 11-830(F), 41-1311 to 41-1313
(1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 70 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 to
67-8004 (1995); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26 (1995); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-1 to 49-33-17 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
536.017, .018 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-102, 75-1-103, 75-1-201 (1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 73 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §113-206(c) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 105 (1994);

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-201 to 12-1-204 (1995); TEX. GovT. CODE ANN. § 2007 (1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to 63-90-4, 63-90a-1 to 63-90a-4 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE § 36.70A.370
(1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-IA-1 to 22-IA-6 (1995); Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-5-301 to 9-5-305 (1995).

For an overview of state property rights measures from a public-sector perspective, see Larry
Morandi, Takings for Granted, STATE LEGIsLAREatas, June 1995, at 22. For an overview of the
nationwide property rights movement from a private-sector perspective, see Peter Samuel, The
Property Rights Movement: Enviros, Regulators Meet Their Match, MINING VoIcE, May/June
1995, at 22.
8. Fla. HB 1437 (1993).

9.
10.

Id.

FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1993 REGuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF House BrLS
at 268, HB 1437.
11. Fla. SB 1000 (1993).
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He concluded

that the measure did not strike a balance between the legitimate interests of private landowners and the public interest in protecting the environment and managing Florida's growth. 3
B.

The Governor'sPropertyRights Study Commission H

As an alternative to the vetoed 1993 legislation, Governor Chiles
created the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission II. 4 It was
patterned after the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission established in 1975 by former Governor Reubin Askew, whose recom-

mendations led to the 1978 enactment of a statutory remedy for
landowners aggrieved by governmental restrictions." Governor Chiles
directed the new commission to consider, among other things, "[t]he

current and potential effectiveness of Florida law in providing substantially affected persons with appropriate remedies of law to protect
their private property rights and any changes necessary to assure
6
meaningful and effective remedy to affected property amounts."
Led by former Florida Supreme Court Justice Alan C. Sundberg of
Tallahassee, the commission held hearings throughout the state.' 7 Its
chief proposal was the creation of an informal, nonjudicial settlement
process to resolve property rights disputes between a landowner and a
governmental entity through payment of compensation or adjustment
of the regulation prior to litigation.1 8 The commission advised against

creating a new cause of action for landowners based on awarding
compensation for a percentage-diminution of the land's market
value.

9

12. veto of Fla. SB 1000 (1993) (letter from c'ov. Chiles to Sec'y of State Jim Smith, June
4, 1993) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
13. Id.
14. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-150 (June 4, 1993). The commission consisted of 17 members,
including: four landowners; one economist familiar with property valuation; two local government officials; the secretaries of the Department of Community Affairs and the Department of
Environmental Protection; a water management district representative; four representatives of
conservation organizations; two persons recommended, respectively, by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate; and one member of The Florida Bar serving as chair of
the commission.
15. E.g., 1978, Fla. Laws ch. 78-85; see also Robert M. Rhodes, Compensating Police
Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 741 (Nov. 1978). For an account
of recent legislative activity in this field leading up to the 1995 Regular Session, see Kent Wetherell, Private PropertyRights Legislation: The "Midnight Version" and Beyond, 22 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 525 (1994).
16. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-354, § 3(b) (Dec. 28, 1993).
17. GovRNOR'S PROP. RTs. STUDY COMM'N [, REPORT OF THa GOVEaNOR'S PROPERTY
RiGHTs STUDY ComasSIoN 11 (1994) [hereinafter GovERNOR's STUDY CO aSSION II].
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 75-76.
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C.

The 1994 Regular Session of the Legislature

The commission's proposal for a new settlement procedure was
considered during the 1994 Regular Session of the Legislature. 20 Other
bills would have allowed a landowner to seek compensation through a
judicial award when a regulation prohibited or severely limited the use
of the owner's real property. 21 Under these bills, if the governmental
entity imposing the regulation could not afford to pay the compensation, it would have been prohibited from imposing the restriction on
the landowner's property. 2 Neither approach, the settlement proce2
dure nor the court-ordered compensation bill, came to a floor vote. 1
D.

The ConstitutionalInitiativeon PropertyRights

At the same time the Legislature was considering these measures, a
citizens' group mounted a well-funded petition drive for four constitutional amendments bundled into one package for petition gathering
purposes. 24 One of the four proposed amendments would have created
a constitutional right to full compensation for a landowner when any
exercise of the police power diminished the value of a vested property
right.Y The package received enough signatures for a ballot position
in the 1994 general election.26
In a validation proceeding to determine whether the four amendments satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements for submission to the electorate, the Florida Supreme Court struck the
property rights measure and two others from the ballot. 27 The court
held that the property rights amendment violated the single subject
requirement for constitutional initiatives 2s and that its ballot title and
summary were not accurate or informative.29 This decision set the
stage for further legislative consideration of the property rights controversy during the 1995 Regular Session.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Fla. HB 1967 (1994).
Fla. SB 630 (1994); Fla. HB 485 (1994).
Fla. SB 630 (1994); Fla. HB 485 (1994).
FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1994 REOULAR SrSSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BnLS

at 345-46, HB 1967; id. at 74, SB 630; id. at 247-48, CS for HB 485.
24.

Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re: Tax Limitation; Advisory Opinion to the Att'y

Gen. Re: Voter Approval of New Taxes; Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re: Property
Rights; Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re: Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 1994).
25. Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 494.

28.
29.

FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
Advisory Opinion, 644 So. 2d at 494.

262

FLORIDA STATE UNIiVERSITY LA W REVIEW

E.

[Vol. 23:255

The 1995 Regular Session of the Legislature

The supreme court's 1994 decision on the constitutional initiative

increased political pressure on lawmakers to legislate a solution to the
controversy. In addition, the perceived political climate underwent
dramatic changes in the 1994 general election. Nationally and in Florida, the tide of public opinion was illustrated by the change in partisan control of the Congress and the Florida Senate. When lawmakers
convened in Tallahassee, the Congress was considering property rights
legislation, and legislatures around the nation were continuing a trend
3

in enacting property rights laws . 0
Both constitutional and statutory proposals were introduced into
the 1995 Regular Session.' One proposed constitutional amendment
would have provided that no owner could be deprived of a use of
private property, or any part of his property, by governmental regulation or action resulting in a "nonnegligible" reduction in the fair market value of that property without full compensation as determined by
a jury.32 A prevailing owner would have been entitled to costs and
attorney's fees."
Statutory measures considered would have declared that any lawful
use of private property could not be deprived or devalued, even temporarily, by an action of government without full compensation.3 4 The
cause of action for such a deprivation or devaluation, entitling the
landowner to a jury determination of compensation, would have
arisen if the governmental action resulted in a temporary or permanent diminution in fair market value of the affected portion of the

30. During the 1995 Regular Session, in Washington State, lawmakers gave legislative approval to a property rights initiative.
The Washington legislation, Initiative No. 164, the Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act,
required full compensation for any reduction in value caused by regulation to any parcel or
portion of private property. Any regulation of private property was prohibited unless a statement analyzing the expected economic impact on regulated property was prepared by the regulator and made available to the public prior to adoption. The initiative forbid governmental
entities from requiring any property owner to provide or pay for any studies, maps, plans, or
reports to be used in decisions that would restrict the use of private property for public use. See
Wash. C.A. 164 (1995) (subject to referendum).
On November 9, 1995, Referendum 48, previously Initiative No. 164, became the third such
referendum in the nation to be voted down. While the measure was defeated by a margin of 3-to2, proponents hope to enact a similar law in next year's legislative session. Doug Conner, Property-Right Vote Losers To Keep Fighting, L.A. Trms, Nov. 9,1995, at Al.
31. Fla. SJR 968 (1995); Fla. HJR 1847 (1995) (proposed amendment to art. X, § 6, Fla.
Const.); Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
32. Fla. SJR 968 (1995); Fla. HJR 1847 (1995).
33. Fla. SJR 968 (1995); Fla. HJR 1847 (1995).
34. Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
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owner's land in excess of twenty-five percent or $10,000, whichever
was greater. The recovery of full compensation would not have been
limited by any percentage or dollar amount. 35 An exception to the
right of compensation would have been carved out for public nuisances, but the governmental entity would have borne the burden of
proving that a proscribed land use constituted a public nuisance.3 6 A
prevailing owner would have been entitled to attorney's fees and
7
costs. 1
Against this backdrop, Governor Chiles sought to develop a more
restrained proposal to provide statutory protection for private property rights without undermining Florida's environmental protection
and growth management programs .8
The Governor directed Secretary Linda Loomis Shelley of the Florida Department of Community Affairs to convene an ad hoc working
group to draft a consensus proposal which would win the support of
lawmakers and affected constituencies. 9
As the 1995 Regular Session unfolded, the working group toiled for
weeks with important support and involvement from legislative sponsors of various property rights measures. A constitutional remedy was
rejected as an option in order to allow any necessary adjustments in
the new remedy without the cumbersome and time-consuming procedures involved in amending the Florida Constitution. 40
The working group produced a draft bill which included a statutory
remedy to provide compensation for landowners in situations which
do not rise to the level of a taking, but it rejected an automatic numerical formula for determining when relief is warranted. 41 The bill
also included a new nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing

35. The House bill did not specify that recovery would be available only if the diminution
of value exceeded the greater of $10,000 or 250/i. Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
36. Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
37. Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
38. Lucy Morgan, Chiles Seeks Law To Repay Small Landowners, ST. PEaT. Tnmis, Mar.
30, 1995, at B5.
39. The working group included representatives from state agencies, including the Department of Community Affairs, the Department of Environmental Protection, and the Eminent
Domain Section of the Department of Transportation; regional entities, including regional planning councils and water management districts; local governments, including the Florida Association of Counties and the Florida League of Cities; environmental organizations, including the
Florida Audubon Society, 1000 Friends of Florida, the Florida Wildlife Federation, and the
Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association; development interests, including the
Florida Home Builders Association and the Association of Florida Community Developers; and
landowning interests, such as the Florida Farm Bureau, the Florida Land Council, and the Property Rights Coalition (an alliance of agricultural and landowner interests).
40. Morgan, supranote 38.
41. For a discussion on the drawbacks of the formulaic approach, see GovaRwOR's STUDY
COMaMSSION II, supra note 17, at 71-75.
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procedure for land use and environmental permitting disputes, a procedure patterned after the recommendations of the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission lI.42 With only one significant change
by the Legislature, 43 the working group's bill was enacted by lawmakers with just one dissenting vote."
Aside from the scrutiny the bill received when being hammered out
in the working group, the legislation received ample hearing and formal consideration by lawmakers. Section 1, which created the judicial
cause of action for landowner relief, was fully debated in both the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on
Community Affairs, as Senate Bill 2912. 4. Sections 2 through 5 were
added to Senate Bill 2912, which was reported favorably by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary as a committee substitute." Section 2,
which created the nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing procedure, also received a hearing in the Real Property and Family Law
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, as House
Bill 1335. 47

On the House floor, the provisions of Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 2912 and House Bill 1335 were incorporated into one
amendment which was adopted as a substitute for the language in another bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 863. That bill as
amended was then thoroughly debated and passed by the House.4
Committee Substitute for House Bill 863 was sent to the Senate for
9
floor debate and final legislative approval.'
III.

THE BERT J. HARRIS, JR., PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION ACT

Section 1 of the legislation is the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act5 ° (Harris Act), named after the Highlands
42.

For a discussion of the settlement procedure, see infra part IV.

43.

FLA. H.R. JouR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995); see Elizabeth Willson, Lobbyist Takes a Big

Leap-and Lands on Some Toes, ST. PETE. Tma,
amendment, see infra text accompanying note 57.

July 5, 1995, at B5. For the text of the

44.

FLA. H.R. JOuR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
FLA. LEoLs., HISTORY OF LEoISLATnoN, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILS
at 266, SB 2912.
46. FLA. S. JOUR. 551 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
47. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEOISLATION, 1995 REGuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE Bis
at 141, HB 1335. This bill was placed on the agenda for the House Judiciary Committee, but the
committee meeting was canceled for unrelated reasons, and the House Judiciary Committee did

45.

not meet again during the 1995 Regular Session.
48.
49.

Id. at 101, HB 863; FLA. H.R. JoutR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
FLA. H.R. JouR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995).

50.

FLA. STAT.

§ 70.001 (1995).
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County legislator who has championed property rights legislation for

years. The Harris Act creates a new cause of action to provide compensation to a landowner when the actions of a governmental entity
impose an "inordinate burden" on the owner's real property.3 It is
intended to apply to governmental actions that do not rise to the level
of a regulatory taking."
In general, the new judicial remedy is intended to protect either a

landowner's existing use of the land or a vested right to a specific use
of the land from an inordinate burden which a state, regional, or local

governmental agency imposes.

3

This remedy is subject to many im-

portant limitations and exclusions." Therefore, in any potential claim
it is critical to evaluate the landowner's property interest in light of all
the statutory requirements for relief.
When compared to the textual basis for relief from a regulatory
taking, namely, the sparse language in the Fifth Amendment and the
Florida Constitution, the Harris Act is richly detailed in the substantive legal standards and procedural mechanisms for obtaining relief.

However, precisely because Harris Act claims were expected to be "ad
hoc, factual inquiries, ' 55 as those in takings cases, the working group
which prepared the legislation favored an approach under which the
full import of the Harris Act ultimately would be determined by judicial construction and application. In other words, judicial interpretation on a case-by-case basis was considered inevitable, necessary, and

desirable.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 70.001(9). The Harris Act filled a void in then-existing Florida law because, prior
to its enactment, there was no nmeans by which an owner could receive compensation for the
adverse financial effects of governmental regulation of his land without satisfying the constitutional standards for a taking, namely, physical invasion or the loss of all economically viable
use. See Dep't of Comm'y Aff., CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis 1 (May 15, 1995) (on file
with Dept.).
53. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3) (1995). The Legislature did not appropriate funds for implementation of the Harris Act. See 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-181. To avoid running afoul of the constitutional prohibition against unfunded mandates, article VII, section 18, of the Florida
Constitution, the Legislature expressly determined in the Harris Act that there was an important
state interest in protecting private property owners from inordinate burdens on their property.
FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1) (1995).
The Legislature also met two of the listed alternatives which remove an enactment from this
constitutional bar: 1) that any expenditure necessary under the Act would apply to all persons
similarly situated, including state and local governments, section 70.001(3), FloridaStatutes; and
2) the Act was approved by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each chamber of the Legislature. The vote was 111-0 in the House of Representatives, and 38-1 in the Senate. FLA. LEGIS.,
HISTORY OF LEOISLATION, 1995 REGuLAR SESSboN, HISTORY or HousE BnmLs at 101, HB 863; see
also Dep't of Comm'y Aff., CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis 6 (May 15, 1995) (on file with
Dept.).
54. For a discussion of the limitations and exclusions, see part lII.C.
55. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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Definitions

In any legislative enactment, the definitions imposed on particular
terms are crucial for understanding the scope of the measure. That is
certainly true with the Harris Act; it includes a number of definitions
which are intended to set boundaries on the scope of the statute.
1.

Existing Use

The Legislature adopted two alternative definitions for an "existing
use" of land which is protected by the Harris Act. Both reflect established legal principles.
a. Actual, Present Use or Activity
An existing use of land means "an actual, present use or activity on
the real property," notwithstanding periods of inactivity normally associated with or incidental to the activity . 6 This portion of the definition of existing use is intended to encompass land uses engaged in by
the landowner even though there might be some intermittent quality
to the use or activity. For example, a period of inactivity could include land's lying fallow in association with the growing of crops or
timber.
b.

Reasonably ForeseeableFuture Use
An existing use also may mean
such reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are
suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent
land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the
property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use
or activity on the real property."

So long as the requested use is suitable for the property, compatible
with adjacent land uses, justifiable by an appraisal, and is not speculative, it would qualify as an existing use protected by the Harris Act
58
from certain governmental actions.
This alternative definition of existing use was and is very controversial, primarily among those who did not favor the enactment of

56.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b) (1995).

57.
58.

Id.
Id.
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property rights legislation. 9 In fact the definition stitches together
longstanding concepts which are not usually linked together and recasts them in a new legal context.6 Aside from its merit on legal and
policy grounds, this provision was central to building a broad base of
political support for passage of the legislation.
The first drafts of the Harris Act were considered by some legislators and participants in the working group to offer little or nothing to
the landowners whose disputes with regulatory agencies had propelled
the property rights movement . 6 I Because government is already equitably estopped from impairing vested rights to existing uses, these legislators and landowners viewed the early drafts of the Harris Act, which
protected "vested rights" and an existing use defined only as "an actual, present use or activity" on the land, as offering only an addi2
tional item on the menu of remedies already available to landowners.
Further, these legislators and landowners recognized that government
only rarely deprives a landowner of the actual, present use of land,
halts an activity being conducted on an owner's land, or seeks to infringe on a vested right.63 Accordingly, for the Harris Act to be meaningful to landowners, it had to offer a remedy in some circumstances
in which regulatory permission was denied for the conversion of land
to a future use in which the owner's rights were not otherwise protected.
As a legal concept for an existing land use, the alternative definition
is well-grounded in the law of eminent domain. 4 In a condemnation
proceeding, valuation of the property is based upon the highest and
best use.65 The highest and best use is not limited to those uses authorized under the existing land development regulations." If on the date
of taking there is a reasonable probability of a land use change, that
probability may be taken into account in determining valuation.6 7 An
59. Elizabeth Willson, Property Act Fences Out the Government, ST. PaTE. TIMEs, July 5,
1995, at BI.
60. See, e.g., Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979); Board of Comm'rs of
State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), cert. denied,
101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958).
61. Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 19, 1995) (on file with
comm.) (discussion of SB 2912); Fla. S. Comm. on Comm'y Aff., tape recording of proceedings
(Apr. 24, 1995) (on file with comm.) (discussion of SB 2912).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. FLORIDA EMINENT DomAIN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9.32 (4th ed., Fla. Bar C.L.E.
1988) [hereinafter FLORIDA EMINENT DoMArN].
65. State Road Dep't Co. v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963); Cameron Dev. Co. v.
United States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1994).
66. FLORMA EMINENT DomAiN, supra note 64, § 9.33.
67. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So.
2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), cert. denied, 101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958).

268

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol.23:255

important factor in determining the highest and best use of property is
whether the property is suitable for that proposed future use.A How69
ever, such a future use may not be wholly speculative.
Seen in the context of the law of eminent domain, there are circumstances in which a prospective future use may be considered an existing land use, and therefore compensable. That is at the heart of the
Harris Act's alternative definition of an existing land use, which
reaches some future uses. Altogether, it is a remarkably conventional
idea in a legal system which has embraced the doctrine of future inter70
ests in land since medieval England.
The proof necessary to establish that a future land use is reasonably
foreseeable could come from such authorities as an adopted local
comprehensive plan, local land development regulations, or a credible
appraisal which relies at least in part on nonexisting but reasonably
expected future uses. 7' Particularly relevant would be evidence of the
owner's ability or inability to secure financing based on these documents. 72 The comprehensive plan and land development regulations
adopted by the relevant local government also would have a bearing
on the suitability and compatibility issues.
This alternative definition is intended to reach future land uses such
as "next-in-line" acreage adjacent to developed or developing lands.
This is particularly applicable when a landowner applies for approval
of a use already enjoyed by neighboring landowners. But even in these
cases the application of the alternative definition is not revolutionary.
A landowner who could meet the test of this alternative definition
probably would have a cause of action founded on reverse spot zoning, denial of equal protection, or perhaps deprivation of substantive
due process, based on the argument that denying the requested land
use would be arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless, as with situations
in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel might apply, the Harris
Act represents a new opportunity for compensation where only an equitable remedy previously was available.

68. FLORIDA EMNENT Dosz.nt, supra note 64, § 9.32.
69. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
70. See generally WLkm HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 34-73, 171-85 (5th ed.
1942).
71. FLORIDA EuNENT DOMAIN, supra note 64, § 9.32. It would go too far, however, for a
local government to utilize its comprehensive plan to purport to define the term "reasonably
foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses" for Harris Act purposes in a way other than it has been
defined by the Legislature-any more than a local government could adopt its own definitions

for the terms "equitable estoppel" or "substantive due process" as utilized in the Harris Act.
72.

Id.
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Vested Rights

2.

A "vested right to a specific use" under the Harris Act must be
determined by applying common law principles of equitable estoppel,
constitutional principles of substantive due process, or state statutory
principles. 73 These foundations for establishing vested rights are separate and independent; accordingly, rights may vest for purposes of the
Harris Act under any one of these three alternative theories.
a.

EquitableEstoppel

The estoppel doctrine is grounded in equity and focuses on whether
it would be inequitable to allow a governmental entity to repudiate its
prior conduct. 74 In one of the leading cases, the Second District Court
of Appeal followed the trial court in explaining that
... the theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than an
application of the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted
to invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to
snatch the mat away to 7the detriment of the party induced or
permitted to stand thereon.
Equitable estoppel will be applied to government regulation of land
use if a property owner in good faith, while relying upon some act or
omission of government, has made a substantial change in position or
has incurred extensive obligations and expenses, so that it would be
inequitable and unjust to destroy the acquired right. 7 6 Each of these
vesting criteria has received valuable judicial interpretation and application, 77 and the Legislature relied on these cases in establishing an
equitable estoppel basis for vesting.7
The remedy provided by the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to bar
the governmental entity from interfering with the owner's rights

73.
74.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(a) (1995).
E.g., Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963) (estoppel applied

against city to forbid rescission of a building permit); see also Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M.
Sellers, Vested Rights: EstablishingPredictabilityin a ChangingRegulatory System, 20 STETSON
L. REv. 475, 476 (1991).
75. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
(quoting trial court).
76. Id; see also City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1973), rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976).
77. Rhodes & Sellers, supranote 74, at 478-89.
78.

FLA. STAT. § 70.80(a) (1995).
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79
acquired by virtue of his reliance on the prior governmental action.
In other words, the owner gets to complete the authorized activity.
Compensation is not a remedy. 0 Therefore, by providing equitable estoppel as one basis for acquiring rights which may be a basis for a
Harris Act claim, the Legislature in effect has added compensation as
a remedy for the landowner in a certain category of equitable estoppel
cases.

b.

Substantive Due Process

Rights also may vest for purposes of the Harris Act by applying
principles of substantive due process."' This provision enables the judiciary to craft a constitutionally based vesting test that is separate
from takings theories or remedies and distinct from equitable estop2
pel.8
True to its substantive due process roots, this vesting standard
could focus on whether an owner has acquired a constitutionally protected property interest that should not be diminished or frustrated by
government action." In some instances, the protected interest could be
established by applying and satisfying estoppel principles, but the new
test should go further. 4
The linchpin for establishing substantive due process vesting could
be the existence of reasonable, investment-backed expectations in a
particular use.8 5 This approach draws from a judicially crafted concept which courts have used to analyze both takings and Fourteenth
Amendment vested rights claims .86 In addition, it parallels the statu87
tory test for determining whether property is inordinately burdened.
This test would mean an inordinate burden need not be found if
vested rights exist based on investment-backed expectations. A

79.

Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 74, at 475; see also City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 427

So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

80.

Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 74, at 475.

81.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3) (1995); see also Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474

U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
82. Regarding the recognized but muddled distinction between equitable estoppel and constitutionally-based vested rights, see David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63-65;
see also City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
83. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
84. Perry, 408 U.S. at 601; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
85. For a comprehensive discussion of investment-backed expectations, see Daniel Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URBa. LAw. 215 (1995).
86. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
87.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
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determination of whether vested rights exist is only the first step in
evaluating a Harris Act claim; determining whether the governmental
action inordinately burdens those rights is the next. An inordinate
burden may be found only if a restrictive government action results in
an owner's permanent inability to attain reasonable, investmentbacked expectations in a vested right. 8 Thus, relying upon the concept
of reasonable, investment-backed expectations both to establish a
vested right and to determine whether the governmental action constitutes an inordinate burden is not a tautology.
Vested rights founded on substantive due process could extend protection to situations which might not be covered by estoppel. Consider, for example, multiple-phase or multiple-use projects for which
only a conceptual or master plan and a first phase or initial use have
been approved when government imposes new regulatory restraints. If
an owner can establish a property interest founded on reasonable, investment-backed expectations in completing the entire project and all
uses, the interest may vest for purposes of the Harris Act under this
substantive due process theory. 8 9 By contrast, if applying the doctrine
of equitable estoppel, which focuses on an owner's reliance and
change of position on a specific governmental action, in certain circumstances, only the approved first phase or initial use may be vested
for Harris Act purposes. 90
c.

Statutory Vesting

The Harris Act protects rights vested by virtue of legislative enactments. A variety of statutes create such rights. Among them are
vested rights provisions in the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, 9' the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act, 92 the statute creating
the surface water management regulatory program, 9 and the statute
creating the coastal construction control line program.9
Local government vesting provisions, on the other hand, are not
addressed under this provision and therefore are not a basis for a

88.
89.

Id.
Id.

90. For an example of partial vesting by application of statutory criteria, see Compass Lake
Hills Dev. Corp. v. Department of Comm'y Aff., Div. of State Planning, 379 So. 2d 376 (Fla.

1st DCA 1979) (partial vesting under section 380.06(12), now codified at section 380.06(20),
FloridaStatutes (1995)).
91.

FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8) (1995).

92. Id. § 380.05(18) (areas of critical state concern); id. § 380.06(20) (developments of regional impact).
93. Id. §373.414(11)-(16).
94. Id. § 161.052.
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Harris Act claim. However, a local government vesting ordinance
should be a basis for a Harris Act claim if it fairly implements a particular state statute. For example, local government comprehensive
plan policies and land development regulations which implement section 163.3167(8), Florida Statutes, by defining "a final local development order" or by establishing when development "is continuing in
good faith" should be covered by this theory.95
Local government plan policies or development regulations which
codify equitable estoppel common law principles are not covered by
the Harris Act's categorical protection of rights vested pursuant to
state statute. However, as noted, owners who can satisfy common law
equitable estoppel criteria will be vested under the previously discussed part of the Act's vested rights definition.
3.

Governmental Entity

A "governmental entity" includes any agency of the state, any regional agency, any local government entity, or any other entity that
independently exercises governmental authority.9 It does not matter
whether the governmental entity was created by the Florida
Constitution 97 or by general or special law. The United States and its
various agencies do not fall within this definition; thus their actions
are not subject to relief under the Harris Act.
4.

Action of a GovernmentalEntity

The term "action of a governmental entity" means a specific action
which affects real property. 98 It expressly includes action by the governmental entity on an application for development approval or other
permit,99 but it is intended to go beyond that to other actions which
adversely affect the ability of a landowner to use the land.1°°
The governmental action must have "directly restricted or limited
the use" of the owner's land.' 0 ' This requirement should be

95.

96.
97.
CONST.
dressed

See id. § 163.3167(8).

Id. § 70.001(3)(c).
This provision encompasses the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. FLA,
art. IV, § 9. It also precludes any argument that certain local governmental entities adin the Florida Constitution are not within the ambit of the Harris Act. E.g., id. art,

VIII, § 6(e), (f) (Metropolitan Dade County).

98.
99.

FLA. STAT. §70.001(3)(d) (1995).
Id.

100.

Id.

101. Id. § 70.001(3)(e). Although technically part of the definition of an inordinate burden,
this phrase is important primarily for delineating the type of governmental action which is subject to a Harris Act claim.
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interpreted to mean that an action's effect is "[i]n a direct way without anything intervening; not by secondary, but by direct, means."' 12
A governmental action which indirectly burdened or inadvertently devalued an owner's land, because of regulatory decisions regarding another owner's property, would be too attenuated for relief under the
Harris Act.° 3
On the other hand, the directness requirement should not be converted into a straitjacket. It should not, for example, be construed to
mean that a statute, rule, ordinance, or regulation must specifically
set forth in detail the precise restriction on a particular owner's property. Such a construction would be at odds with the legislative intent
that the Harris Act address grievances arising from statutes, rules, regulations, or ordinances "as applied" to private land. 104
Governmental inaction, that is, the decision by a governmental entity not to act, is not within the ambit of the Harris Act.
5. InordinateBurden

After demonstrating the existing use or a vested right to a specific
use, a landowner must then demonstrate that the governmental action
is an "inordinate burden," which entitles him to relief. 05 In order to
demonstrate an inordinate burden, the landowner must meet either
one of two statutory tests.
a. Expectations Not Realized

Under the first test, the effect of the governmental action must satisfy three criteria. 106 First, the governmental action must have directly
restricted or limited the use of real property to the extent that the
landowner is unable to realize the reasonable, investment-backed expectation of the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a
specific use of the real property. tm Second, the deprivation of the reasonable, investment-backed expectation must be permanent.'0 8 Third,
the deprivation must expressly be to the real property as a whole.109

102.

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 414 (6th ed. 1990).

103. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 95-78 (1995). A cause of action must be commenced no more than
one year "after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at
issue." FiA. STAT. §70.001(11) (1995) (emphasis added).
104. Id.§ 70.001(1).
105. Id.§ 70.001(3)(e).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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UnreasonableUse and Unfair Burden

The alternative test for demonstrating an inordinate burden is to
show that, by virtue of the regulatory action, the landowner has been
left with existing uses or vested rights which are so unreasonable that
the landowner permanently bears a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public and which, in fairness, should
be borne by the public." I0 This test allows the court to take remedial
action when governmental action has been unreasonable or has excessively limited the uses on a landowner's property.
There are limitations and exceptions with respect to when a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an owner's land. These limitations and exceptions, discussed below with similar provisions,"' will
limit the circumstances in which relief will be available under the Harris Act. For overriding policy reasons, some governmental actions will
continue to be subject only to the other constitutional and statutory
remedies which are otherwise available to a landowner." 2
6. Property Owner
The term "property owner" means the "person who holds legal title to the real property" which is the subject of the Harris Act
claim."' Under existing Florida law, a person may include a natural
person, firm, association, joint venture, partnership, estate, trust,
business trust, syndicate, fiduciary, corporation, or other group or
combination." 4 Any one of those then may initiate a Harris Act
claim. Governmental entities expressly not included in this definition
are thus not considered persons under the Harris Act and therefore
may not bring a Harris Act claim.''5
The Harris Act does not expressly address the nature of the estate in
land that a person must hold in order to bring a Harris Act claim, but
a broad reading of the statute would reach any legal interest in land,
such as an easement serving a legal interest. A person with only an
equitable or other beneficial interest appears not to be authorized to
bring a Harris Act claim.

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.

See infra part In.C.
FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
Id. § 70.001(3)(f).

114.

Id.§ 1.01.

115.

See id.
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Real Property

The term "real property" means "land, and includes any appurtenances and improvements to the land" as well as any other relevant
land in which the owner has a relevant interest. 116 There are at least
two significant aspects to this definition.
First, this definition expressly includes "any other relevant real
property in which the property owner had a relevant interest"; it thus
encompasses the entire parcel in which the owner has a legal interest." 7 This construction is supported by reading it in conjunction with
the definition of "inordinate burden," which expressly requires that
the existence of an inordinate burden be determined by reference "to
the real property as a whole.""" Thus, the court will be required to
determine-by examining other relevant parcels of real property in
which the owner has a relevant interest-whether the property "as a
whole" has been inordinately burdened."19 This whole-parcel requirement reflects precedent in the context of constitutional takings. '20
Second, the term "real property" includes "any appurtenances and
improvements to the land."'' This phrase is patterned after the definition of "land" in the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act, 122 but it goes further by not including customary notions
of land as a limitation on the improvements and appurtenances which
23
will be regarded as real property for purposes of the Harris Act. 1
B. Procedurefor Bringing a Civil Action
The Harris Act sets forth, in detail, the procedure which a landowner must follow in bringing a claim under the statute. It is intended

116.

Id. § 70.001(3)(g).

117.

Id. The use of the term "relevant interest" in the definition of real property is unfortu-

nate. It should be read as meaning a legal interest in land; to read the statute otherwise would be
inconsistent with the use of the term "legal title" in the definition of property owner.
118. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
119.

Id.

120. Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1994); Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Schindler, 604 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Department of Transp. v. Jirik, 471 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 498 So. 2d 1253

(Fla. 1986); Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983).
In determining whether portions of an owner's property should be considered as a whole or
treated separately, courts have considered such factors as parcel contiguity, unity of use, unity of
ownership, intent of the owner, and particular factual circumstances. City of Riviera Beach v.
Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
121.
122.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(g) (1995).
Id. § 380.031(7) (" 'land' includes any improvements or structures customarily regarded

as land").
123. For example, billboards would fall within the ambit of this definition even though they
might not be considered a customary appurtenance or improvement to the land.
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both to strike a balance between public and private interests and also
to promote settlement short of a judicially imposed resolution of the
dispute.
1.

Actions Priorto Filinga Civil Action

Before bringing a civil action under the Harris Act, the landowner
must notify the governmental entity of the claim and wait a limited
period of time for a response. 1 This notification process is one of the
procedural devices built into the Harris Act to promote settlements
without resort to litigation.
a.

Conditions Precedent

At least 180 days prior to filing a civil action, the landowner must
present a written claim to the head of the governmental entity which
has taken the action at issue.1 21 The claim must be accompanied by a
bona fide appraisal which demonstrates the loss in fair market value
to the property. 126 This requirement is based on similar requirements
in other statutes which authorize legal actions against governmental
entities. 27 It is intended to put the governmental entity on notice of its
potential liability and to create an opportunity for settlement, but-as
will be seen-the requirement also gives the governmental entity a
chance to improve its position in any subsequent litigation.
If more than one governmental entity is involved in the governmental action or, if in the view of either the landowner or a governmental entity to whom a claim is presented, all relevant issues can be
resolved only by involving more than one governmental entity, the
landowner must present the claim to each governmental entity

124.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1995).

125.

Id.

126. Id. The Harris Act does not require that the appraiser preparing the appraisal be certified, licensed, or registered. Id. Section 475.612, Florida Statutes, prohibits persons from using
the titles "certified real estate appraiser," "licensed real estate appraiser," "registered real estate
appraiser," or other words to that effect, without being certified, registered, or licensed in accordance with chapter 475, FloridaStatutes. Generally, such certification, registration, or licensure by the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board is required for persons who hold themselves out
as certified, registered, or licensed, or who issue appraisal reports in connection with federally
related transactions. See id. §§ 475.610, .612, .613. The requirements that the appraisal be

"bona fide" and "valid" allow the governmental entity to whom the appraisal is submitted to
exercise some judgment as to the quality of the appraisal. Id. § 70.001(4)(a). Since the appraisal
requirement is intended to support the claim of the owner, the greater the validity of the appraisal, the greater the likelihood that the governmental entity would rely on the appraisal in
evaluating the owner's claim.
127. E.g., id. § 403.412.
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involved.' 2 Because the owner may subsequently commence a civil action only against a governmental entity which has received the claim
and had a 180-day notice period, 29 the Harris Act creates an incentive
for an owner to bring in all governmental entities which may be liable.
b.

Written Offer to the Landowner

During the 180-day notice period, the governmental entity must
make a written settlement offer to resolve the claim. A settlement offer may include 1) an adjustment of development or permit standards
which control the use of the land; 2) increases or modifications in the
density, intensity, or use of development areas; 3) transfer of development rights; 4) land swaps or exchanges; 5) mitigation, including payments instead of on-site mitigation; 6) location on the least sensitive
portion of the property; 7) conditions on the amount of development
or use of the land; 8) a requirement that issues be addressed more
comprehensively than the use or uses immediately proposed; 9) issuance of a development order, variance, special exception, or other
form of extraordinary relief; 10) public purchase of the owner's property, or acquisition of a less-than-fee-simple interest in it; or 11) no
change to the governmental action which occasioned the claim. 30
This broad authority and menu of options creates an opportunity
for innovation in resolving disputes with landowners, even if some of
these remedial steps are not otherwise addressed by the governmental
entity's underlying regulatory code.
c.

Acceptance and Resolution

When a settlement would constitute a modification, variance, or
special exception to application of an ordinance, rule, or regulation,
the Harris Act directs that the relief protect the public interest served
by the ordinance, rule, or regulation at issue and be appropriate to
3
prevent the inordinate burden on the real property.' '
The Harris Act also delegates to each state, regional, and local governmental entity the authority to enter into a settlement which

128.

Id. § 70.001(4)(a). The Harris Act thus gives the governmental entity the opportunity, in

effect, to implead another governmental entity prior to a complaint being filed in circuit court.
Unfortunately, the statute does not prescribe the procedural mechanisms for accomplishing this
intention. Apparently, the governmental entity receiving the initial claim may require the landowner to serve a copy of the claim on another governmental entity. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 70.001(4)(c). This list of potential remedies is almost identical to the remedies
proposed for consideration in the nonjudicial settlement procedure established in section 2 of the
legislation. Id. § 70.50(19)(b); see infra text accompanying note 361.
131. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)l (1995).
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contravenes statutory requirements so long as it "protects the public
interest served by the statute, . . . and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately
burdening the real property.' 32 In addition, the court must approve
133
the settlement in a consent decree.
The public policy issues which may come into conflict through implementation of this pre-suit settlement provision were addressed recently by the Florida Supreme Court. In Abramson v. Florida
Psychological Association,'34 the supreme court upheld a settlement
agreement by which the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation agreed to the licensure of two psychologists, subject
to certain conditions, even though the applicants did not meet all statutory requirements."' The supreme court succinctly explained the conflicting legal and policy issues in this way: "Administrative agencies
have the authority to interpret the laws which they administer, but
such interpretation cannot be contrary to clear legislative intent. At
the same time, the power of a public body to settle litigation is inci36
dental to and implied from its power to sue and be sued.' 1
In its decision, the court declined to answer a certified question regarding the circumstances under which an agency may settle a lawsuit
on terms inconsistent with its delegated legislative authority "because
[the court does] not believe that a general rule can be formulated
which would be applicable under all circumstances.' ' 1 37 Further, the
supreme court confined its ruling to the facts of the case and reiterated the litany of reasons offered by the agency as justification for the
settlement. 3 8 Plainly, the court was uneasy about the case.
While the Abramson decision does not provide firm footing for the
pre-suit settlement provision of the Harris Act, 3 9 it does provide a

132.

Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2.

133.

Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2. For a thorough discussion of issues related to utilizing consent de-

crees as settlement vehicles, see David L. Callies, The Use of Consent Decrees in Settling Land
Use and Environmental Disputes, 21 SmTsoN L. REv. 871 (1992).
134. 634 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1994), reversing, 610 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
135. Id. It was not clear whether the settlement was the subject of a consent decree entered
by the court, but the original litigation continued with other plaintiffs after the two psychologists
settled and withdrew from the original litigation. Id. It was a subsequent challenge to implementation of the settlement which led to the decision by the Florida Supreme Court.
136. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The decision has been criticized for containing "no real discussion of the critical issue
regarding the source of legal authority for an agency to enter into a settlement agreement which
contravenes the agency's enabling act." Scott Boyd, How the Exception Makes the Rule: Agency
Waiver of Statutes, Rules, and Precedent in Florida,7 ST. THOMAS L. Rv.287, 298 (1995).
In another recent case, a divided court affirmed without discussion a consent decree which was
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frame of reference for evaluating the issues raised by this provision.
First, the supreme court acknowledged that the settlement of litigation
is incidental to the authority to sue and be sued. 40 Second, in the best
manner of case-by-case adjudication, the court focused on the justifications for this particular settlement, noting that the deviation from
the statute was "minimal.' 41 Third, and most importantly, the court
observed that agencies may not act "contrary to clear legislative intent." 142 This third observation presents the crux of the matter here.
The Harris Act provides clear legislative authority for a governmental entity to make a minimal departure from a statutory requirement in a particular case where a Harris Act claim has been filed by a
landowner. This express legislative direction, coupled with the implied
authority to enter into settlements by virtue of a governmental entity's
authority to sue or be sued 43 and the public policy in favor of settling
disoutes,'" provides the necessary legal basis for pre-suit settlements
which include discrete deviations from statutory requirements.
This grant of authority satisfies the separation of powers provision
of the Florida Constitution.' 4 In a Harris Act settlement, any departure from existing statutory requirements must "protect the public interest served by" the underlying statute, and it must provide no more
than "the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental
46
regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property." '
' 47
These criteria constitute the "minimal standards and guidelines' 1

tantamount to an exception to statutory dredge-and-fill permitting requirements. Eastpointe
Condominium Ass'n I, Inc. v. Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 636 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
(per curiam affirmance). In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Glickstein objected to the court's
affirmance of the consent decree partially because existing law did not authorize the permit exception. Id. at 723. In a companion case that may presage issues arising from implementation of
the pre-suit settlement provision of the Harris Act, the same court affirmed the agency's denial
of a petition by a third party requesting a formal administrative hearing on the agency's decision
to enter into the settlement agreement which resulted in the consent decree. The court grounded
the latter decision solely on its affirmance of the consent decree. Singer Island Civic Ass'n, Inc.
v. State Dept. of Envt'l Reg., 636 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), rev. granted, 649 So. 2d 234
(Fla. 1994), rev. denied sub nomn., 652 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1995).
140. Abramson v. Florida Psychological Association, 634 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1994), reversing, 610 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
141. Id.
142. Id.

143.

Id.

144.

Id.

145. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. Like its predecessors, this provision incorporates the nondelegation doctrine into the state's organic law. See, e.g., State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 47
So. 969, 976 (Fla. 1908) (The Legislature "may not delegate the power to enact a law or to
declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law.").
(emphasis added).
146.

Fs.A. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)1-2 (1995).

147.

Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978).
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necessary to prevent governmental entities from "acting through
whim, favoritism, or unbridled discretion."14
Though general in nature, these standards are valid and adequate.
The supreme court has held that the specificity of standards provided
by the Legislature "may depend upon the subject matter dealt with
and the degree of difficulty involved in articulating finite standards. 1 49 Given the complexity and technical nature of the situations
which may arise under Harris Act claims and the number and diversity of the state, regional, and local governmental entities charged
with implementing the measure, the Harris Act presents a situation
which is "not conducive to specific, detailed instructions from the
Legislature."' 5 0 While general, these standards nevertheless "are susceptible of legal interpretation based upon the facts of a given
case."' Accordingly, they satisfy the requirements of the nondelegation doctrine.
Even if the statutory standards are deemed inadequate for separation of powers purposes, the courts have recognized an exception to
the nondelegation doctrine which would apply. This exception applies
when the statutory delegation involves exercise of the police power to
regulate a business operated as a privilege rather than a right.5 2 In
such situations, it is not essential that the statute include a specific
standard for the exercise of discretion. Instead, the governmental action is limited by a standard of reasonableness.'
The regulated activities being addressed under the Harris Act fall
within that exception. In Apalachee Regional Planning Council v.

Brown,5 4 the First District Court of Appeal applied this exception to
fee-setting for review of developments of regional impact (DRIs) because the DRI law "serves as a control of the privileges of land development which is potentially dangerous to the citizens of more than
one county." 5 The court characterized the DRI process as a dynamic
one, requiring "a large degree of flexibility and expertise due to a

148. In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov., 509 So.2d 292, 311 (Fla. 1987).
149. Id.

150.

Bigler v. Department of Banking & Fin., 368 So. 2d 449, 450-51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979),

aff'd, 394 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1981).

151.
152.

Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
Apalachee Regional Planning Council v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA

1989), aff'd, 560 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1990).

153.

Department of Bus. Reg. v. Jones, 474 So. 2d 359, 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. de-

nied, 484 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1986).
154. 546 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), aff'd, 560 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1990).

155. Id.at453.
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myriad of variables,"' 15 6 which make precise statutory standards unrealistic. 117
Similarly, the regulated activities addressed by the Harris Act involve land development. Governmental entities, in their adherence to
the Harris Act, will be faced with a wide range of issues regarding the
application of many statutory measures to many owners. The "complexity and needed flexibility inherent in the [regulation of land development] as it applies to individual applicants is too pronounced to be
'58
practicably placed within the scope of legislative responsibility.'
Therefore, in implementing the pre-suit settlement provisions of the.
Harris Act, governmental entities would be subject to a rule of reasonableness in the absence of valid minimal standards and guidelines.
Of course, there are legal obstacles to be negotiated along the path
of pre-suit settlement. For example, any settlement must be structured
to avoid claims of contract zoning. 15 9 It also must accord all interested
parties a modicum of procedural due process, especially in situations
which do not require judicial review. 6 While this provision is an important remedy under the Harris Act, it is distinct from the judicial
remedy provided elsewhere in the statute and constitutes a separate
6
means for achieving resolution of land use disputes.' '
As a practical matter, the situations in which these aspects of the
pre-suit settlement provision will be implicated will be rare precisely
because one of the standards is that the settlement "protect the public
interest served by" the statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance at issue
in the Harris Act claim. 162 While this provision is intended to open
new options for creative problem solving, this standard will constrain
governmental entities in settling Harris Act claims.
d.

Ripeness Decision

Also during the 180-day notice period, unless the landowner accepts
the settlement offer, the governmental entity must provide the landowner with a written "ripeness decision.' ' 63 The Harris Act does not
prescribe the form or specific contents of the ripeness decision, but it
sets forth the general requirement that the ripeness decision
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159.

Zoning:
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Robert M. Rhodes, Terry E. Lewis & James C. Hauser, Contract and Conditional

The Not So Dubious Distinction, 56 FIA. B.J. 263 (Mar. 1982).
See Callies, supranote 133, at 879-95.
See Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1968).
FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)1 (1995).
Id. § 70.001(5)(a).
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"identif[y] the allowable uses to which the subject property may be
put" under the applicable regulations of the issuing governmental entity.'6

The ripeness decision is intended to permit the landowner to go directly to circuit court after the expiration of the 180-day notice period,
rather than having to pursue other administrative remedies.' 6' This
procedural device was deemed an essential feature of the Harris Act
because the issue of ripeness goes to whether the court has subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a claim and, in the takings context, has

become a major source of frustration for landowners.166
Under the prudential doctrine of ripeness in the land use setting,

compensation claims are not within the court's subject matter jurisdiction until the governmental "authority has determined the nature and
extent of the development that will be permitted" on the subject property. 161 The drafters of the Harris Act concluded that, for an owner to
have a meaningful judicial remedy under the Act if a settlement were
not reached during the 180-day notice period, the issue of ripeness
should not be allowed to impede the owner's subsequent request for

judicial relief. 16s Thus, the drafters came up with the requirement for
a ripeness decision.169

164. Id.
165. Id. Significantly, the Harris Act provides that "the matter shall be deemed ripe or final
for the purposes of the judicialproceedingcreated by this section." Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
a ripeness decision in response to a Harris Act claim will not necessarily satisfy the ripeness
requirements for other types of actions, specifically for a civil action alleging a taking without
just compensation.
166. E.g., Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989).
167. Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1120 (1991); see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
Florida courts have adopted federal doctrine on ripeness. E.g., Glisson v. Alachua County,
558 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990). For a comprehensive review of federal and state ripeness cases in a regulatory taking context, see Taylor v.
Village of North Palm Beach, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1831 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 16, 1995).
168.

FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a) (1995).

169. This provision is intended to preclude Kafkaesque situations such as the ping-pong judicial proceedings involving Richard and Anne Reahard of Lee County, Florida. Reahard v. Lee
County, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, No. 89-227-CIV-FTM10C. In the period leading up to enactment of the Harris Act, the Reahard case had a profound
effect on Florida landowners' perceptions about the efficacy of existing judicial remedies for
their grievances. Id.
In 1989, the Reahards sued Lee County for taking their property by designating it a Resource
Protection Area under the Lee County Comprehensive Plan. Id. The lawsuit was filed in state
circuit court. Id. It was removed to United States District Court on the motion of Lee County.
Id. A federal magistrate determined that the Reahards had exhausted their state administrative
remedies and concluded that the claim was ripe for federal court disposition. Id. A jury awarded

PROTECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

19951

The requirements that the governmental entity make a settlement

offer and identify the uses to which property may be put is intended
to change the way regulators deal with land use issues. The Act is
intended to shift the focus from whether a proposed use is allowable
to what uses are allowable. In this regard, regulators may seek options
in a more cooperative way, which could accommodate an owner's
wishes while achieving the public policy objectives of underlying statutes, rules, ordinances, or regulations applied to the owner's real
property.
2.

70

Commencement and Conduct of a Civil Action

If the governmental entity does not make a bona fide offer to settle
the issue, or if the landowner rejects the settlement offer and ripeness
decision, the landowner may file a claim in circuit court 180 days after

filing the written claim.' 71 The court will decide whether the landowner is entitled
to compensation, 17 and, if so, a jury will decide the
73
1
amount.
a. Jurisdictionand Venue
The Harris Act specifies that the claim must be brought in circuit
court, and there is no minimum jurisdictional amount. 174 Venue for
this proceeding is the county where the real property is located. 7
the Reahards $700,000 plus accrued interest. Id.
Lee County appealed. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11 th Cir. 1992). Reversing the
trial court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the magistrate
had misapplied the test for regulatory takings. Id. at 1134. The Eleventh Circuit then issued an
addendum opinion, instructing the magistrate to address the issue of ripeness. Reahard v. Lee
County, 978 F.2d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir. 1992).
On remand, the magistrate again held that all state remedies had been exhausted and reinstated the jury verdict. Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1414 (1Ith Cir. 1994). Again, Lee
County appealed. Id. Again, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that state
administrative remedies had not been exhausted. Id. at 1418. Again, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case, 'this time with directions to remand the case to the state circuit court from
which it had been originally removed. Id.
The Reahards' petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied.
Reahard v. Lee County, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995).
170. The Harris Act ripeness process fulfills at least one of the functions of the judicial
ripeness policy by recognizing that regulatory decisions are subject to change based on input
from various and competing interests, and thus provides for administrative or political resolution of disputes. See Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994).
171. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a), (b) (1995).
172. Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
173. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
174. Id. § 70.001(5)(b).
175. Id.
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Joinder

The landowner must serve the complaint on the head of each gov76
ernmental entity making a settlement offer and ripeness decision.
This provision contemplates that each governmental entity whose actions contributed to the alleged inordinate burden had received a copy
of the claim during the notice period, either by election of the land77
owner or at the instigation of a governmental entity.'
c. Determinationof InordinateBurden
In the action, the court first must determine whether there has been
an existing use or a vested right to a specific use of the real property.
Second, the court must determine whether an existing use or vested
78
right has been "inordinately burdened" by the governmental action.
In determining whether the governmental action constitutes an inordinate burden, the court must consider and apply the standards set
forth in the Harris Act as well as the governmental entity's settlement
offer and ripeness decision. 79
1
A governmental entity may avail itself of the opportunity to put its
last, best offer forward in the settlement offer and ripeness decision.
This is intended to allow the governmental entity to relieve an inordinate burden and perhaps avoid litigation. If litigation ensues, it affords the governmental entity an opportunity to present the court with
an offer perhaps more reasonable than the initial governmental action. Accordingly, the determination to be made by the court, in effect, is whether the last, best offer by the governmental entity, if
accepted, would constitute an inordinate burden.
If the actions of more than one governmental entity are at issue,
and the entities are parties to the proceeding, the court must apportion responsibility among them. 80 Significantly, the apportionment
must occur before the valuation issue is addressed. 8' The Harris Act
expressly provides that the apportionment must not be on a pro rata
basis, but rather on the basis of "the percentage of responsibility each

176.

Id.

177.

See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.

178. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(a) (1995).
179. Id. In determining whether there has been an inordinate burden, only the final settlement offer and ripeness decision are admissible; proposed settlement offers, ripeness decisions,
and negotiations are inadmissible for these purposes. Id. § 70.00](6)(c)3.
180.
181.

Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
Id.
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such governmental entity bears with respect to the inordinate bur-

den.''
d.

152

InterlocutoryAppeal

Before the issue is submitted to the jury for an award of compensation, a governmental entity may take an interlocutory appeal of the
court's determination that there has been an inordinate burden." 3 The
circuit court may stay the proceedings during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal, but the statute expressly provides that a stay is not
8 4
automatic upon the filing of an interlocutory appeal.
If the governmental entity prevails in the interlocutory appeal, then
the action is at an end, and the landowner must pay the governmental
entity's attorney's fees and costs under conditions specified by the
statute. 8 5 If the governmental entity does not prevail in the interlocutory appeal, the circuit court is directed to award the landowner his
attorney's fees and costs incurred in the interlocutory appeal.8 6 In addition, the landowner will receive prejudgment interest on his compensation for the period of delay occasioned by the interlocutory

appeal.

17

e. Attorney's Fees and Costs
Attorney's fees and costs are recoverable from the governmental entity if the landowner prevails on the liability issue, whether in the first
phase of the proceeding or on appeal, if the circuit court finds the
governmental entity did not make a bona fide offer which would have
resolved the landowner's claim during the 180-day notice period.8 8
Among other things, this standard requires the circuit court to determine whether the governmental entity acted in good faith in

182.
183.

Id.
Id.

184. But see FLA. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2) (providing for automatic stay upon appeal by a
government agency).
The Harris Act contains language that arguably contradicts the authority of the court to proceed with the compensation phase of the proceeding notwithstanding an interlocutory appeal. It
states that the court is to impanel a jury to determine compensation "following the resolution of
any interlocutory appeal." FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b) (1995). This phrase should be read as
meaning the circuit court must proceed with the compensation phase following an interlocutory
appeal in favor of the landowner, unless that phase has otherwise been commenced during the
pendency of the appeal.
185. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(c)2 (1995).
186. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)1.
187. Id. § 70.001(6)(b) (providing that the landowner will receive "prejudgment interestfrom
the date the claim was presented to the governmental entity or entities") (emphasis added).
188. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)l.
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making its settlement offer. 8 9 However, the court is not required to
evaluate the terms of the settlement offer from the perspective of the
landowner or otherwise. 190 If more than one governmental entity is
responsible for the inordinate burden, the award of attorney's fees
and costs shall be apportioned among them on the basis of their percentage of responsibility for the inordinate burden. 19'
This provision does not address the prospect that the landowner
would prevail after rejecting a bona fide settlement offer; in that situation, the landowner would have to pay his own attorney's fees and
92
costs, unless there was another basis for an award by the court. 1
If the governmental entity prevails on the liability issue in the first
phase of the proceeding or through an appeal, it may recover attorney's fees and costs from the landowner.1 93 In that situation, the Harris Act specifies that the governmental entity or entities shall receive
attorney's fees and costs if
the property owner did not accept a bona fide settlement offer,
including the ripeness decision, which reasonably would have
resolved the claim fairly to the property owner if the settlement offer
had been accepted by the property owner, based upon the knowledge
available to the governmental entity or entities and the property
owner during the 180-day-notice period.94
In this circumstance, the court must determine whether the govern95
mental entity acted in good faith in making its settlement offer.
However, unlike the situation when the landowner prevails, when determining an award of attorney's fees and costs after the governmental entity has prevailed, the circuit court also must determine
whether the settlement offer "reasonably would have resolved the
claim fairly to the property owner."'' 1 In other words, it must evaluate the terms of the settlement offer. In doing so, it may utilize only
information available to both parties during the 18CF-day notice

189.

Id.

190. Id.
191. The Harris Act does not address an award of attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing
landowner where one of two or more governmental entities responsible for the inordinate burden
made a settlement offer in good faith but another did not. In that circumstance, one solution
would be to award the landowner the proportion of her attorney's fees and costs attributable to
the governmental entity which did not act in good faith, based on the percentage of its responsi-

bility for the burden. See id. § 70.001(6)(a), (b).
192. See id. § 70.001(6)(c).
193.
194.

Id. § 70.001(6)(c)2.
Id.

195.

Id.

196.

Id.
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period; 97 thus, new information developed by the governmental entity
or landowner for purposes of the litigation may not be utilized by the
court to evaluate the terms of the settlement offer for purposes of
determining an award of attorney's fees and costs.
The Harris Act does not authorize an award of attorney's fees and
costs to a prevailing governmental entity if it did not make its settlement offer in good faith or if it offered, on the basis of information
then available, settlement terms which would not have fairly resolved
the matter. 191 In those circumstances, the governmental entity will absorb its own attorney's fees and costs.
These provisions increase the importance of the decisions made by
the parties during the 180-day notice period; they create powerful incentives for the governmental entity to make a fair settlement offer
and for the landowner to take it. Because of the high cost of litigation, both landowning and governmental clients will be more likely to
engage in a dispassionate analysis of a Harris Act claim.
f

Determinationof Compensation

If the court determines that the governmental action has inordinately burdened the landowner's property, it must impanel a jury for
the second phase of this bifurcated proceeding. 99 The jury must deter2
mine the compensation to be awarded to the landowner. 00
The Harris Act prescribes the measure of the landowner's damages
as follows:
The award of compensation shall be determined by calculating the
difference in the fair market value of the real property, as it existed
at the time of the governmental action at issue, as though the owner
had the ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed
expectation or was not left with uses that are unreasonable,
whichever the case may be, and the fair market value of the real
property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue,
as inordinately burdened, considering the settlement offer together
with the ripeness decision, of the governmental entity or entities.20'

197. Id. Any proposed settlement offer or proposed ripeness decision and any negotiations
or rejections with respect to the formulation of the settlement offer and ripeness decision are
admissible in the proceeding only for the purpose of determining attorney's fees and costs. Id. §
70,001(6)(c)3.
198. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)2.
199. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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In fixing compensation, the jury may not consider any business damages suffered by the landowner; however, the Harris Act requires a
reasonable award of prejudgment interest from the date the claim was
presented for purposes of initiating the 180-day notice period. 202
Because the Harris Act requires the award of compensation to take
into account the settlement offer and ripeness decision, 203 compensation is not necessarily calculated on the basis of the governmental entity's original action, but rather with respect to the last, best offer of
the governmental entity.20 Thus, the landowner's appraisal utilized at
the outset of the 180-day notice period will not necessarily address all
the issues which the jury will weigh in determining compensation.
3.

Final Judgment

The Harris Act contemplates that any determination and valuation
issues will be concluded in a final judgment entered by the court. 0 5
The court is given specific responsibilities to ensure that both the governmental entity and the landowner receive their intended benefits."
a.

Court'sAuthority To Grant Relief

The court may enter "any orders necessary to effectuate the purposes of" the Harris Act and has broad authority to make final determinations to effectuate the relief available under the Harris Act. 2°7
This authority is important for the resolution of litigated claims, implementation of pre-suit settlements, and upholding any pre-suit settlements against collateral attacks.
b.

Rights Acquired by the Governmental Entity

By operation of law, the government entity which pays the compensation receives the right, title, and interest in rights of use for which
compensation is paid. 08 The governmental entity may hold, sell, or
otherwise dispose of these development rights. 209 When the court has
awarded compensation, it will determine the form and recipient of the
2 10
rights and the terms of their acquisition.

202.

Id.

203.

Id.

204.

Id.

205.

Id. § 70.001(6)(c)3.

206.
207.
208.

Id. § 70.001(7)(a).
Id.
Id. § 70.001(7)(b).

209.
210.

Id.
Id.
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C.

Limitations and Exceptions

The seemingly broad sweep of the Harris Act is deceptive because
the new judicial remedy is subject to limitations and exceptions which
will curtail its use in practice.
1. As-Applied ChallengesOnly
The Harris Act authorizes compensation only for as-applied challenges to governmental actions. This limitation can been seen in several provisions. 2 1 For example, the statement of legislative intent

makes clear that the Harris Act provides compensation "when a new
law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in
the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property.' '212
Accordingly, the Harris Act may not be used to bring a facial challenge to a statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance; the governmental
entity must specifically apply the statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance to the owner's property in order for the owner to have a Harris
Act claim.
As discussed in the working group which drafted the legislation,
there are many examples of governmental action which may restrict or
limit existing uses or a vested right to a specific use and therefore provide a basis for Harris Act relief. These include downzoning, application of a new coastal construction control line to restrict development,
imposition of upland preservation requirements to protect wildlife
habitats, and land use restrictions to protect wellfields.
2. FederalPrograms
The Harris Act does not apply to actions by any governmental entity otherwise covered when it is exercising the powers of the United
States or its agencies through a formal federal delegation. 2 3
Accordingly, actions by the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection based on implementation of portions of the federally delegated National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program are not subject to relief under the Harris Act. 21 4 If the federal
government delegates the authority to administer the section 404

211.

Id.

212.
213.

Id. § 70.001(1) (emphasis added).
Id. § 70.001(3)(c).

214.

Id. § 403.0885; id. § 403.08851.

§ 70.001(l), (9), (11), (12).
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wetlands permitting program to the states, 2 5 state action under this
permitting program arguably would be exempt from Harris Act
claims.
3.

Temporary Impacts

Under the Act, temporary impacts to land do not constitute an inordinate burden for which the governmental entity must provide compensation to the owner.21 6 Therefore, the adverse effects of a valid,
time-limited moratorium would not be actionable under the Harris
Act.
This exception also creates an opportunity for a governmental entity to avoid paying the owner compensation for an action which constitutes an inordinate burden, so long as the burden is promptly
removed from the owner's property. Of course, if the burden
amounted to a taking under constitutional standards, the govern27
mental entity would still be required to compensate the owner.
4.

PublicNuisances at Common Law and Noxious Uses

An inordinate burden does not include impacts to real property
which result from "governmental abatement, prohibition, prevention,
or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use
of private property. 2 18 This exception is one of the principal provisions intended to ensure that the Harris Act does not bring an end to
Florida's efforts to protect its environment and manage its growth.
Because the exception is couched in elastic terms, its scope will be the
subject of continuing discussion and litigation.
The portion of the exception grounded on public nuisafice is dynamic because the common law is "not a fixed body of well-defined
rules embodied in the written records of this or the mother country,
but is rather a method of juristic thought or manner of treating legal
questions worked out from time to time by the wisdom of mankind."2 19 As the Florida Supreme Court has opined with respect to the
common law, "its ever present fluidity enables it to meet and adjust

215. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); see also Martin R. Dix & Scott Denson, Florida'sAssumption
of Federal Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Clearing the Permitting Stream Bed or Muddying Administrative Waters, 67 FLA. B.J. 56 (Apr. 1993).
216. But see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(holding compensable under the Fifth Amendment temporary regulatory takings which deny a
landowner all use of his property).
217. Id.
218. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
219. Orr v. State, 176 So. 510, 513 (Fla. 1937).
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itself to shifting conditions and new demands."' ' 0 Thus, this is not a
static exception embracing only those public nuisances at common law
as of the effective date of the Harris Act, but rather an exception for
those activities which are now or will come to be understood in the
22
future as public nuisances. '
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public. 22 A public nuisance "violates public rights,
subverts public order, decency, or morals, or causes inconvenience or
damage to the public generally."223 By contrast, private nuisances are
torts that involve the invasion of an interest in the private use or enjoyment of land, whether intentional or not.Y Thus, this exception to
the Harris Act may be invoked if the activity which is the subject of
the governmental action violates a right or interest of the general pub225
lic.
A "noxious use of private property" is one which does not necessarily rise to the level of a public nuisance, although it has the potential to inflict injury upon the community. It has commonly been used

220.
221.
ances.
222.

State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973).
The Legislature has statutorily declared numerous uses or activities to be public nuisBLACK'S LAw DicTiONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990).

223. Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1972).
224. Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla.
1953).
225. The Legislature has supplemented judicial determinations of public nuisances with statutory declarations of public nuisances. FLA. STAT. § 125.563(2) (1995) (altering lake shores and
levels by dumping and similar activities); id. § 161.052 (coastal construction without permit); id.
§ 316.077(4) (signage in certain locations); id. § 327.53(7) (discharging raw sewage from vessels);
id. § 335.092(3)(a) (signage within 500 feet of Everglades Parkway); id. § 339.241(3) (maintaining junkyards within 1,000 feet of federal-aid highway); id. § 370.15(5)(e) (unattended shrimp
traps in public areas); id. § 372.98(4) (possessing or selling nutria without license); id. § 373.433
(stormwater management system in violation of rules); id. § 386.041(l) (listed conditions injurious to health); id. §§ 388.011(9), .291(3) (conditions which breed mosquitoes and flies in annoying numbers); id. § 479.105(1) (unpermitted signs adjacent to state or federal highway); id. §
514.06 (operation of swimming pool in violation of law); id. § 550.255 (horse and dog racing for
prizes without pari-mutuel license); id. § 585.15 (pest or disease of animals under state rules); Id.
§ 593.116(3) (cotton plants not destroyed after notice of assessment); id. § 823 (bonfires, diseased animals, houses of ill repute, improperly discarded white goods, smoke in elevators, derelict vessels, sale of controlled substances or obscene materials, releasing unsterilized cats and
dogs from shelters).
Thus, one issue in construing this Harris Act exception is whether it includes statutory public
nuisances. At least one state court has opined that a legislature by statute may "change the
common law as to nuisances, and may move the line either way, as to make things nuisances
which were not so, or to make things lawful that were nuisances." Commonwealth v. Parks, 30
N.E. 174, 175 (1892) (emphasis added). Under this theory, statutorily declared public nuisances
become part of the common law of nuisance. Conversely, an argument can be made that the
reference to a "public nuisance at common law" excludes statutorily defined nuisances under
principles of statutory construction. Ultimately, the issue may be academic because this exception also reaches "noxious uses of private property."
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to describe odiferous activities which may constitute a public
nuisance, 226 as well as activities akin to private nuisances. 227 And, of
course, it was used in early takings cases to describe land uses whose
22
proscription was not compensable under some circumstances. 1
Taken together, these terms and the case law which has given them
meaning do not establish a clearly defined exception. Instead, they
provide commonly accepted guideposts for determining land uses and
activities which may be subjected to an inordinate burden without
compensation under the Harris Act.
5. Relief Under the HarrisAct
Impacts to real property caused by governmental action to grant
relief under the Harris Act do not constitute an inordinate burden on
another landowner's property.2 9 This exception is intended to encourage governmental entities to grant relief to a landowner without concern that doing so will result in a Harris Act claim by another
landowner who contends the relief granted to the first landowner
amounts to an inordinate burden on the second landowner's property.
6. Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Harris Act expressly provides that it is not intended to supplant
or preclude any form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that
may be agreed to by the parties and is lawfully available for resolution
of a claim. 2 0 For example, arbitration, mediation, and other alternatives to litigation are still available, and "governmental entities are
encouraged to utilize such methods to augment or facilitate" the
availability of relief under the Harris Act. 2 1 The most logical opportunities for doing so would be during the 180-day notice period.
226. E.g., Farrugia v. Frederick, 344 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (upholding
denial of permit to construct canal because waters would become stagnant and noxious); Lee v.
Florida Pub. Utils. Co., 145 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962) (calling fumes expelled by

diesel-powered electrical generating units noxious).
227. E.g., Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1954) (cemeteries and funeral homes located
in residential areas); Mercer v. Brown, 190 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (maintaining animal
reduction plants); Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983) (maintaining cesspools); Town of Surfside v. County Line Land Co., 340 So. 2d 1287 (Fla.
3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1977) (failing to control garbage dump).
228. In early takings cases, the terms nuisance and noxious use were often used interchangeably. E.g., Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 172 (1915) (livery stable); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (brewery). However, takings cases should not necessarily be relied upon
to determine the scope of this exception to the Harris Act, section 70.001(9), FloridaStatutes, so
this authority is of limited value in determining the scope of this exception.
229. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(9) (1995).

230.

Id. § 70.001(8).

231.

Id.
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Transportation

The Harris Act does not apply to governmental actions which in-2
23
volve operating, maintaining, or expanding transportation facilities.
Furthermore, the Act does not affect existing law regarding eminent
2
domain relating to transportation. 11
The Florida Statutes define "transportation facility" as "any
means for the transportation of people and property from place to
place which is constructed, operated, or maintained in whole or in
part from public funds. ' 3 4 The statutes have also defined it as "the
property or property rights, both real and personal, of a type used for
the establishment of public transportation systems which have heretofor the
fore been, or may hereafter be, established by public bodies
23 5
transportation of people and property from place to place.
Accordingly, aside from not disturbing the law of eminent domain
as it relates to public acquisition of right-of-way for a highway, the
Harris Act would not apply to such governmental actions as the grant
or denial of access permits to state roads under the State Highway
System Access Management Act. 23 6 Depending upon the circumstances, similar regulatory actions by local governments could be exempt from Harris Act claims.
8.

Statute of Limitations

In order for a subsequent cause of action to be brought in circuit
court, a claim must be presented to the governmental entity within
one year after the new statute, rule, ordinance, or regulation is applied to the landowner's property. 7 If a landowner elects to take advantage of lawfully available administrative or judicial remedies prior
to seeking relief under the Harris Act, the time for bringing the Harris
2 8
Act claim is tolled until the conclusion of those other proceedings.
9.

Sovereign Immunity

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state, its agencies,
and its political subdivisions may not be sued absent a waiver of the

232. Id. § 70.001(10).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 334.03(3 1). This definition is applicable to the Florida Transportation Code. Id. §
334.03.
235. id. § 163.566(11). The accompanying definition of "public transportation" refers to
common carriers such as trains and buses. Id. § 163.566(8).
236. Id. §§ 335.18-.188.
237. Id. § 70.001(11).
238. Id.
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doctrine by statute or constitutional amendment. 3 9 A waiver must be
clear, specific, and unambiguous. 2 40 The Harris Act expressly author-

izes lawsuits against governmental entities 24' and thus constitutes a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Harris Act provides that it is not intended to affect the sovereign immunity of government. 2 2 This provision should be construed
as meaning only that, by enactment of the Harris Act, the Legislature
has not waived or otherwise affected the doctrine of sovereign immunity except to the extent that the Harris Act authorizes claims to be
brought against the state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions.
This provision should not be construed to impose additional statutory
requirements beyond those in the Harris Act.
10.

Grandfathering

Finally, and most significantly, the Harris Act is strictly a forwardlooking measure, 43 with an effective date of October 1, 1995.1" It ap-

plies only to specific actions of a governmental entity based on a statute enacted after the final adjournment of the Legislature on May 11,
1995,24 5 or a rule, regulation, or ordinance adopted after that date.

239. Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 103 So. 422, 424 (Fla. 1925); McWhorter v. Pensacola &
A.R. Co., 5 So. 129 (Fla. 1888).
240. Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1978).
241. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13. Although the Harris Act does not use the phrase "waives
its sovereign immunity" or similar language, it expressly authorizes an owner who has met certain conditions precedent to "fil[e] an action under this section against a governmental entity."
FLA. STAT.

§ 70.001(4)(a) (1995).

242. Id. § 70.001(13).
243. The statement of legislative intent expressly provides that itaddresses only situations
involving "a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance." Id. § 70.001(l) (emphasis added).
244. Id. § 6. Even before it became legally effective, the Harris Act was the subject of great
interest in the legal community, including the courts. Taylor v. Village of North Palm Beach,
659 So. 2d 1167, 1173 n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So.
2d 1174, 1182 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
245. The term "enact" as employed in the Harris Act means final passage by both houses of
the Legislature in the identical form. Thus, the final act in a bill becoming a law-signature by
the Governor or the expiration of the requisite time period without veto-is not necessary in
order for an enactment to be excluded from the purview of the Harris Act under this exception.
In the legislative process, when a bill is ordered enrolled following final passage by both
houses, the first line of the title, "A bill to be entitled," is removed, leaving the measure to read,
"An act relating to ...." See FLA. STAT. § 11.07 (1995). The measure is then transmitted to the
Governor, whose role is to determine whether the act should become a law.
Several references in the Florida Constitution to the process of enactment support this conclusion. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. Il, § 9 (laws shall take effect 60 days after final adjournment
"of the session of the legislature in which enacted"); id. art. V, § 2(a) (court rules "may be
repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote" of both chambers).
References in the Florida Statutes also support this conclusion. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1.04
(1995) ("[almendments enacted during the same session"); id. § 11.075 ("[p]rior to the
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Governmental actions based on a statute enacted before that date, or
a rule, regulation, or ordinance adopted before that date, or one formally noticed for adoption before that date are not subject to claims
2
under the Harris Act. 46
An action based on a subsequent amendment to a grandfathered
statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance may be a basis for a Harris Act
claim, but "only to the extent that the application of the amendatory
language imposes an inordinate burden apart from" the grandfathered statute, rule, ordinance, or regulationY47
This provision provides perhaps the most significant and, for landowners, the most controversial limitation regarding the availability of
this new remedy. It is intended to prevent application of the Harris
Act to governmental actions based on environmental protection and
growth management programs which predate May 11, 1995, on the
ground that they were put into place by government agencies in the
expectation that landowners would be owed compensation for adverse
regulatory decisions only if those decisions rose to the level of a con24
stitutional taking.
The more problematic aspect of this exception is the limitation
which authorizes compensation awards on the basis of post-May 11,
1995 amendments to pre-May 11, 1995 statutes, rules, regulations, or
ordinances.249 Applying this provision in practice is likely to prove difficult.
D. Intent and Construction
In light of the unique purposes and intent of the Harris Act, a court
should not necessarily construe it using the case law regarding takings
claims under the United States and Florida constitutions if the governmental action does not rise to the level of a taking.2 50 In addition, the
Harris Act is distinct from section 2 of the legislation, which establishes a nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing procedure. 21 The
52
two are not necessarily to be construed in pari materia
enactment of any general or special law"); id. § 11.076(1) ("[a]ny general law, enacted by the
Legislature"); id. § 11.242(5)(c) (general laws "enacted by any current session of the Legislature"); id. § 11.242(5)(i) (expired, obsolete, invalid and other laws omitted by reviser's bills "enacted by the Legislature").
246. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(12) (1995).
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 70.001(9).

251. For a discussion on the non-judicial settlement and expedited hearing procedure, see
infra part IV.
252.

FLA. STAT. § 70.80 (1995).
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Summary

The Harris Act creates a new judicial remedy for landowners that,

in some respects, bears a striking resemblance to existing remedies under the law of takings. Each case will be an ad hoc, fact-intensive
inquiry to determine whether a particular governmental action in-

trudes too far into the landowner's domain. When it does, compensation will be due.
In all likelihood, however, the chief effect of the Harris Act will not
be an explosion of litigation or a rash of damage awards. Rather, it
will produce a sense of caution on the part of the regulators who are
entrusted with the responsibility of protecting Florida's environment
and managing its growth. That was the intention of the new law's legislative sponsors.253 Already there is evidence that the Harris Act has
25
254
had that effect, both among state agencies and local governments.
The Harris Act was not intended to chill all new regulation, but careful consideration should be given to whether the Harris Act is implicated in proposed governmental actions. In a period of public
skepticism about government action, such consideration ought to help
restore confidence in Florida's regulatory system.
IV.

FLORIDA LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ACT

Section 2 of the 1995 property rights legislation is the Florida Land
Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act (Special Master
Law). 2 56 The Special Master Law attempts to resolve growth management and environmental permitting disputes at the state, regional, and
local levels by establishing an informal, nonjudicial settlement and

253. James Martinez, New Law Will Let Property Owners Sue State Over Regulatory
Losses, TALL. DEM., May 19, 1995, at BI, B2 (quoting Rep. Dean Saunders, Dem., Lakeland, as
saying: "I think folks are ready for government to think twice before they just adopt a regulation. That's part of the intention here-to think about the impact you could potentially have on
a property owner.").
254. The Department of Environmental Protection delayed plans, at least temporarily, to
declare certain waters in Collier County as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) with a heightened
degree of regulatory protection. Emma Ross, State Stills Wiggins Water Protections, NAPLaS
DAILY NEws, Aug. 7, 1995, at Dl. It cited a need to consider the implications of the Harris Act
on the OFW designation, even though the new law was not in effect. Id.
255. In Palm Beach County, for example, local officials scaled down an ambitious plan to
utilize regulatory measures to prevent development of certain farmlands in western Palm Beach
County. George Bennett, Ag Reserve Buyout Plan Cut in Half, PALM BEACH POST, June 14,
1995, at B1. They blamed the Harris Act in part for forcing their retreat, even though the new
law was not yet in effect. Id.
256. FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995).
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expedited hearing procedure overseen by a neutral third party. 217 The
Special Master Law provides a landowner with an opportunity for negotiated relief and an impartial advisory hearing in disputes involving
adverse consequences from a decision on a "development order" or
an "enforcement action" by a "governmental entity. ' 258 This new
of other ADR processes together into a
procedure integrates aspects
25 9
new form of proceeding.
The Special Master Law is based on the 1993 recommendations of
the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission I1260 and typifies
the increasing reliance on ADR techniques to address controversies involving land use and environmental regulation. 26' Unlike the Harris
Act, the Special Master Law may be invoked in disputes arising from
decisions based on statutes, rules, ordinances, or regulations predating
May 11, 1995.262
A.

Definitions

As with the Harris Act, the Special Master Law's definitions for
particular terms are crucial for understanding the scope of this measure. Again, however, the two measures are intended to be interpreted
own terms and are not necessarily to be construed
and applied by their
263
in parimateria.
1. Development Order
A "development order" means any order or notice of proposed
agency action which grants, grants with conditions, or denies an application for a "development permit." 26 Rezoning of a specific parcel of
land is expressly included; however, actions by state agencies and local
257. Id. For a critique of the "colonization" of ADR by the legal profession, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted
or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991). For an alternative view, see James J.
Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 47 (1991).
258. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(3) (1995).

259.

For a discussion of some of the practice issues raised by this hybrid process, see Michael

K. Lewis, The Special Master as Mediator, 12 SETOm HALL LEGOS. J. 75 (1988); Lawrence E.

Susskind, Court-AppointedMasters as Mediators, I NEGOTIATION J. 295 (1985).
260. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-150 (June 4, 1993).
261. For a discussion of the ADR procedures adopted for the local comprehensive planning
program, see infra text accompanying notes 382-96.
262. See FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995).
263. Id. § 70.80. This statement of legislative intent may prove problematic when it comes to
a term which receives an identical definition in both statutes. Compare id. § 70.001(3)(g) with id.
§ 70.51 (2)(g) (definition of "land").

264.

Id. § 70.51(2)(a).
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governments relating to comprehensive plan amendments are ex26
cluded .
2.

Development Permit

A "development permit" means any "building permit, zoning permit, subdivision approval, certification, special exception, variance,"
or other action of local government, as well as any permit under state
law which authorizes the development of real property.2" This definition is based upon the definition of the same term in section
163.3164(8), Florida Statutes, but is expanded to include permits is267
sued by state and regional agencies.
3. Development
The Special Master Law does not define the term "development."
Therefore, the definition of development set forth in section 380.04,
Florida Statutes, should be applied in this context. 2 However, for
two reasons the exclusions from that definition should not be applied
in the context of the Special Master Law. 269 First, the exceptions are
expressly intended to apply "for [the] purpose of this chapter," meaning Chapter 380, FloridaStatutes.2 70 Second, the Legislature intended
the Special Master Law to serve a remedial purpose and be liberally
271
construed to that end.
4. Owner
An "owner" means a person with a legal or equitable interest in
real property who filed an application for a development permit and
received a development order.2"2 It also means one who holds legal or
equitable title to real property which is the subject of an enforcement
action. 273 A person may include a natural person, firm, association,
joint venture, partnership, estate, trust, business trust, syndicate, fi274
duciary, corporation, or other group or combination.

265.
266.

Id.
Id. § 70.51(2)(b).

267.

See id. § 163.3164(8) (defining development as "the carrying out of any building activ-

ity or mining operation, the making of any material change in the use or appearance of any
structure or land, or the dividing of land into three or more parcels").
268.
269.
270.

See id.§ 380.04.
Id. § 380.04(3).
Id.

271.

Id. § 70.51(29).

272.
273.
274.

Id. §70.51(2)(d).
Id.
Id. § 1.01.
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Unlike the Harris Act, the definition of "owner" in the Special
Master Law expressly includes a person with an equitable, as opposed
to a legal, interest in land. 2"1Furthermore, governmental entities are
not expressly excluded. Accordingly, a school board could request a
special master proceeding on a land use decision by a local government with regulatory authority over land.
5.

GovernmentalEntity

The Special Master Law does not include the United States or any
federal agency as a "governmental entity. ' 27 6 Therefore, a landowner
cannot request a special master proceeding from a federal agency such
as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. On the other hand, unlike the Harris Act, the Special Master Law does not expressly carve
out an exception for actions by state, regional, or local governmental
277
entities when acting under a formal delegation of federal powers.
6.

Land or Real Property

The term "land" or "real property" means land and "includes any
appurtenances and improvements to the land, including any other rel278
evant real property in which the owner had a relevant interest.
This definition is identical to the Harris Act's definition;2 79 however, it
is broader in scope because the definition of owner in the Special Master Law reaches both legal and equitable interests in land. 2 0 Therefore, the definition of land in the Special Master Law should be
interpreted to encompass the owner's entire property, meaning relevant land in which the owner has either a legal or equitable interest,
and any structure or improvement on the land, regardless of whether
it customarily would be regarded as part of the real property.
7. Enforcement Action
The Special Master Law does not define the term "enforcement action," but the definition should encompass actions by state, regional,
and local government agencies to enforce environmental protection
and growth management laws as well as the terms of individual development orders. Because, as a matter of law, the definition of

275.
276.
277.

Compare id. § 70.51(2Xd) with id. § 70.001(3)(f).
Id. § 70.51(2)(f.
See id. § 70.001(3)(c).

278. Id. § 70.51(2)(g).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 116-123.
280.

FLA. STAT. § 70.51(2)(d) (1995).
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"governmental entity" does not exclude state, regional, or local governmental entities exercising federally delegated authority,," an action
by a state, regional, or local agency enforcing a federally delegated
program could be the basis for a special master proceeding.
8.

Unreasonableor Unfairly Burdens

Unlike the Harris Act, which provides an ample, if flexible, definition for the operative legal standard, 28 2 the Special Master Law does
not define the term "unreasonable or unfairly burdens" which must
be applied by the special master to determine a landowner's rights. 2 3
Deliberately opting to omit a definition of the term, the drafters chose
to rely on the common sense judgment of the special master selected
by the parties themselves.
The Special Master Law does identify factors the special master
may use to determine whether a development order or an enforcement
action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens an owner's property.2 4
These factors are 1) the history of the property; 2) the history of development and use of the property; 3) the history of land use and environmental controls on the property; 4) the present nature and extent
of the property; 5) the reasonable expectations of the owner; 6) the
public purpose to be achieved by the development order or enforcement action at issue; 7) the uses authorized for and restrictions imposed on similar property; and 8) any additional relevant
25
information. 1
In the event a settlement is not voluntarily reached by the parties,
the special master may consider the above factors when determining
whether a development order or enforcement action is unreasonable
or unfairly burdensome.2 86 Such a determination will necessarily require a balancing process.
B.

Initiation of Proceeding

A landowner who believes a development order or enforcement action is unreasonable or unfairly burdensome may apply for relief un28 7
der the Special Master Law.

281.

Id. § 70.51(2)(f).

282.
283.
284.

Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
Id. § 70.51(2).
Id. § 70.51(18).

285.
286.
287.

Id. § 70.51(18)(a)-(g). This list is not inclusive.
Id. § 70.51(17)(b).
Id. § 70.51(3).
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1. ConditionsPrecedent
Prior to requesting relief from a local government development order, the landowner must exhaust all local administrative appeals so
long as they do not take longer than four months. 288 If the local administrative appeal takes longer than four months, the landowner may
apply for relief four months after commencement whether or not the
local administrative appeal has been concluded. 28 9
2. Request for Relief
In order to commence a special master proceeding, the statute requires that the landowner file a request for relief with the appropriate
governmental entity.29 The filing is intended to be a simple action
without the trappings of most legal proceedings.
a. Filing the Request
The owner must file a written request for relief with the appointed
or elected head of the governmental entity. 29' The request must be
filed within thirty days after receipt of the development order or notice of the governmental action at issue.2 92 No filing fee may be
charged, and the governmental entity is required to participate in the
29
proceeding if one is requested.

b.

1

Contents of Request
The Special Master Law specifies the bare-bones information which

must be included in the request. 29 This information includes 1) a brief

statement of the owner's proposed use of his land; 2) a summary of
the development order or description of the enforcement action, including a copy of the development order or documentation of the enforcement action, such as a notice of violation; 3) a brief statement of
the impact of the development order or enforcement action "on the
ability of the owner to achieve the proposed use of the property"; and
4) a certification showing on whom copies of the request have been
served.2 95
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. § 70.51(10)(a).
Id.
Id. § 70.51(4).
Id.

292.

Id. § 70.51(3).

293.
294.
295.

Id. § 70.51(4), (11).
Id. § 70.51(6)(a)-(d).
Id.
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Although the statute does not require it, sound practice would include submitting a copy of the development permit application, if one
exists, with the request for relief. Furthermore, an owner would be
well-served by submitting carefully selected information showing how
the governmental action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the property.
c.

Effect of Request for Relief

Initiation of a special master proceeding tolls the time to seek judi296
cial review of local development orders and enforcement actions.
This filing also tolls the time to seek an administrative hearing under
section 120.57, Florida Statutes, for those agency actions subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 7 As a consequence, entities
should amend their ordinances and rules regarding the availability of
such judicial and administrative relief to indicate the effect of a request for relief under the Special Master Law.
3.

Waiver of Rights

In any proceeding involving a development order or enforcement
action, initiation of judicial review by a landowner will waive all
rights under the Special Master Law. 291 A landowner's petition for an
administrative proceeding pursuant to section 120.57, Florida Statutes, whether formal or informal, also waives the landowner's rights
299
under the Special Master Law.
In either circumstance, however, another party to the development
order or enforcement action proceeding could request judicial review
or a section 120.57 proceeding without foreclosing the opportunity for
the landowner to request relief under the Special Master Law. 3 Although perhaps counter-intuitive and certainly unusual, such a situation would be within the legislative intent to provide this form of
relief for landowners.
4. Partiesand Participants
The Special Master Law sets up two categories of those who may
present their interests for consideration in a special master proceeding.
They are "parties" and "participants.""'

296.
297.
298.

Id. § 70.51(10)(a).
Id. § 70.51(10)(b); id. § 120.57.
Id. § 70.51(10)(a).

299.

Id. § 70.51(10)(b).

300.
301.

Id.
Id. § 70.51.
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Parties

The parties to the proceeding include the landowner and the governmental entity. 2 The landowner may name more than one governmental entity in the request for relief if the burden is the result of
multiple development orders.303
The special master may join additional governmental entities as parties to the proceeding at the request of the landowner or the governmental entity, if the action at issue is the culmination of a process
involving more than one governmental entity or if it is necessary for a
complete understanding of the issues. 3D4 A governmental entity joined
to the proceeding by the special master must participate in both the
mediation and the hearing, if one is held.30° A governmental entity
joined to the proceeding by the special master must also file a response to the landowner's request for relief.?0l

b.

Participants

Others may participate in the proceeding within limited bounds.3 °7
The governmental entity must forward a copy of the landowner's request to the owners of contiguous real property and certain persons
who participated in proceedings leading up to the development order
or the enforcement action. 3 °8 These persons may request status as participants at the hearing, if one is held, within twenty-one days of receiving a copy of the request.3 09 In order to be accepted as a
participant, such a person must demonstrate that he is "substantially
affected" by the subject matter of the proceeding.3 10 The special master ultimately must determine whether a prospective participant satisfies this statutory requirement. 3 1'

302. Id. §70.51(11).
303. Id. § 70.51(3).
304. Id. § 70.51(11).
305. Id. ("requiring that those governmental entities so joined shall actively participate in
the procedure").
306. Id. § 70.51(16)(b).
307. Id. § 70.51(12).
308. Id. § 70.51(5).
309. Id. § 70.51(12).
310. Id.
311. A body of case law has developed around this standard as it is utilized in Chapter 120,
FloridaStatutes, for determining access to rule challenge proceedings under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See id. §§ 120.54(4), .56. For an in-depth discussion on access to rule challenge
proceedings, see Patricia A. Dore, Access to FloridaAdministrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 967 (1986).
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Such persons will not be classified as parties or intervenors if accepted into the proceeding.3" 2 As a result, they may address only issues
regarding alternatives to the development order or enforcement action
33
as the alternatives might affect the persons' substantial interests.
5. Selection of Special Master
The first and most important step after submission of the request
for relief is the selection of the special master. The statute sets forth
several requirements which must be met but leaves important ques314
tions unaddressed.
a.

Jointly Selected

Within ten days of receiving a request for a special master proceeding, the governmental entity must agree with the landowner on the
special master who will conduct the proceeding." 5 The Special Master
Law does not provide guidance on how the parties are to select a special master or from what pool of candidates. The working group
which prepared the legislation concluded that it was better to leave
these decisions to each governmental entity and landowner. In addition, the Special Master Law does not contain a default procedure for
selection of a special master if the parties cannot agree. Fortunately,
the Special Master Law is flexible enough to allow the parties to agree
16
on a default procedure.1
b.

Qualifications
The statute sets forth only minimal qualifications for service as a
special master.117 Qualifications include being a Florida resident and
possessing both experience and expertise in mediation. 8 In addition,
one must possess both experience and expertise in at least one of the
following disciplines: "land use and environmental permitting, land
organization
planning, land economics, local and state government
319
and powers, and the law governing the same.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
tion of
Florida
317.
318.

319.

FLA. STAT. § 70.51(12) (1995).
Id.
Id. § 70.51(2)(c).
Id. § 70.51(4).
After failure to agree, one alternative to be considered is agreement on criteria for seleca special master, with the selection performed by a neutral organization, such as the
Conflict Resolution Consortium at Florida State University, using those criteria.
FLA. STAT. § 70.51(2)(c) (1995).
Id.

Id. Under a grant from the Florida Department of Community Affairs, the Florida

Conflict Resolution Consortium has initiated a training program for persons seeking to serve as
special masters. The Consortium will maintain a directory of persons who have completed its
training program.
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Response to Written Claim

The governmental entity is required to file a response to the request
setting forth the public purpose of the regulations on which the development order or enforcement action is based.3 20 A response may include a request to be dropped from the proceeding. 2' The special
master has authority to decide such a request. 2 In addition, the special master may dismiss a request for relief for failing to set forth the
required information.3 23 However, in that circumstance,
the special
24
master must allow the party to file an amended request.
C.

Conduct of the Proceeding

A special master proceeding has two phases; 325 as a result, the special master has dual roles. The first phase consists of mediation, during which the special master is required to serve as a mediator and
facilitator to assist the parties in attempting to settle the dispute vol26
untarily and without resort to civil or administrative litigation.1
In the second phase, which arises if the parties do not reach a settle3 7
ment, the special master serves as a neutral information-gatherer.
After receiving information from the parties and other participants at
a public hearing, he must make a nonbinding advisory determination
as to whether the development order or enforcement action at issue is
unreasonable or unfairly burdens the landowner's property and, if so,
2
may recommend remedies. 1
In keeping with the settlement-oriented nature of the proceeding,
the actions or statements of all persons in both phases of the proceeding are evidence of an offer to compromise.3 29 Therefore, such actions
are inadmissible in any subsequent judicial or administrative proceeding regarding the subject matter of the dispute.3 0 The governmental
entity may adopt procedural guidelines for the conduct of special

320.
321.

Id. § 70.51(16)(a).
Id. § 70.51(16)(c).

322. Id.
323.

Id. § 70.51(8).

324.
325.

Id.
Id. § 70.51(17)(a), (b).

326.

Id. § 70.51(17)(a).

327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. § 70.51(17)(b).
Id.
Id.§ 70.51(20).
Id.; see also id. § 90.408.
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"
master proceedings; 33
' however, those guidelines should not compromise the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.

1.

Facilitationand Mediation

Because the Special Master Law expressly refers to the first phase of
the proceeding as "mediation, ' 1 2 the permissible techniques and procedures in this phase may be determined by reference to mediation
practice.333
The Special Master Law contains virtually no procedural requirements for the mediation phase. Each party must be represented at the
mediation by someone with authority to bind the principal or to recommend a settlement directly to those with authority to make a binding decision.3 34 The statute gives the special master broad latitude to
structure the mediation as the exigencies require.335 The statute does
not even prescribe when the mediation must occur in relation to the
hearing, so it is conceivable that a special master could conduct a mediation and, if a settlement does not result, conduct a hearing at a
later date, or the special master could conduct the hearing prior to the
mediation in order to resolve factual issues as the basis for a mediated
settlement.
2.

Hearing

The special master must conduct a hearing on the dispute no more
than forty-five days after receiving the request for relief, unless the
parties have settled or agreed to a different date.33 6 The special master
must provide notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing.33 7 The
hearing must be held in the county where the property is located.3
Because of its information-gathering function, there are additional

331. Id. § 70.51(28). The Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium, under its contract with
the Department of Community Affairs, has produced Model Procedural Guidelines for use by
governmental entities in implementing the Special Master Law.
332. Id. § 70.51(17)(a). For the statutory definition of "mediation," see id. § 44.1011(2).
333. In authorizing mediation in various judicial proceedings, the Legislature set forth important statutory policies regarding the conduct of court-ordered mediation. See id. § 44.102.
The law expressly confers judicial immunity on mediators. Id. § 44.107. The Florida Supreme
Court has also established important procedural requirements. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700-.750.
334. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(17)(a) (1995). The authority of the governmental entity's representative is an important factor in determining procedural constraints in the mediation phase. See
News-Press Pub. Co. v. Lee County, 570 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
335. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(17) (1995).
336. Id. § 70.51(15)(a).
337. Id. § 70.51(15)(b).
338. Id. § 70.51(15)(a).
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statutory requirements which the special
master must follow while
3 39
controlling and directing the hearing.
In all respects, the hearing is to be informal and should not require
the services of an attorney. 340 The parties are expected to bring to the
hearing "those persons qualified by training or experience necessary
to address issues raised by the request or by the special master and
further qualified to address alternatives, variances, and other types of
modifications to the development order or enforcement action." 34'
42
The hearing must be open to the public .
The special master has specific powers intended to assure that all
relevant information is brought to the hearing . 34 At any time he may
344
require a party or participant to provide additional information.
The special master may subpoena "any nonparty witnesses in the state
whom the special master believes will aid in the disposition of the matter. 3 45 By requesting relief under the Special Master Law, the owner
consents to inspection of his property by the special master and the
parties .46
D.

SpecialMaster's Recommendation

No later than fourteen days after the hearing, the special master is
required to submit a written recommendation to the parties.3 47 The
3
special master's recommendation is a public record. 4
1.

Settlement

If the parties agree to settle during the mediation or afterward, the
special master must incorporate the settlement in his written

339.

Id. § 70.51(17).

340.

Id. § 70.51(17).

341.
342.

Id. § 70.51(13).
Id. § 70.51(17).

343.
344.

Id.
Id. § 70.51(7).

345.

Id. § 70.51(14). The provision granting subpoena power to a special master is vague

compared to the grant to hearing officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Compare
id. § 120.58(1) with id. § 70.51(14). That provision sets forth prerequisites for issuance of a
subpoena and provides for payment of fees to certain subpoenaed experts. Id. § 120.58(1)(a), (c).

The Special Master Law would be improved by the addition of such provisions.
346.
347.

Id. § 70.51(9).
Id. § 70.51(19). The statute does not expressly require that a copy of the written recom-

mendation be provided to participants, but sound practice and fundamental fairness strongly
suggest that they also receive a copy.
The statute does require that the special master provide a copy of his recommendation to the
Florida Department of Legal Affairs. Id. § 70.51(27).
348. Id. § 70.51(20); see id. § 119.07.
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recommendation.149 In that circumstance, no additional findings, determinations, or recommendations by the special master are required
by the statute, although the hearing may suggest additional proposals
the special master may wish to submit to the parties.
2.

Without Settlement

If the parties do not agree to settle, the special master must make a
written determination as to whether the development order or enforcement action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the owner's property.Y0 If the circumstances warrant, the special master is expressly
required to make the determination on the basis of the development
order or enforcement action at issue "in combination with the actions

or regulations of other governmental entities." '' This provision reflects the reality that the full consequences of one governmental entity's regulatory actions sometimes are fully felt by a landowner only in
concert with those of another governmental entity.
3.

Evaluation of Information Produced at Hearing

The Special Master Law contains seemingly conflicting provisions

regarding the standard to be applied in evaluating the information
produced at the hearing. One passage of the Special Master Law requires the special master to consider "any . . . information produced
at the hearing." 35 2 Another passage requires the special master to limit
his consideration to "information determined relevant by the special

master."

353

349. Id. § 70.51(19)(c). In a circuit court mediation in Florida, by contrast, the settlement
agreement is not necessarily submitted to the court and made public. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b).
In a family mediation in Florida, a settlement must be filed with the court. FLA. R. Crv. P.
1.740(f).
350. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(19)(a) (1995). This provision is an important difference from that
concerning court-ordered mediation in Florida. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a) ("[The] mediator
shall report the lack of agreement to the court without comment or recommendation.").
351. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(19)(a) (1995). This provision does not confine the special master to
considering only formal development orders or enforcement actions of other governmental entities when assessing the combined effect of multiple governmental actions. It is consistent with
the liberal standard for joinder of additional governmental entities. Id. § 70.51(11) ("when a
complete resolution of all relevant issues would require the active participation of more than one
governmental entity").
However, the other governmental actions or regulations must be those of governmental entities that are parties to the special master proceeding. Id. § 70.51(18) (The special master is to
consider the development order or enforcement action "in conjunction with regulatory efforts of
other governmental parties.") (emphasis added).
352. Id. § 70.51(17)(b).
353. Id. §70.51(18)(h).
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This apparent inconsistency is resolved by the requirement that the
special master "weigh all information offered at the hearing. 35 4 This
last provision indicates that the special master should accept all information submitted during the proceeding regardless of relevancy concerns and use it in attempting to facilitate a settlement; but, in
formulating a written recommendation in the absence of a settlement,
the special master may give weight only to relevant information. 55
Among other things, this construction negates the need for the application of rules of evidence, which in any event are not authorized by
the Special Master Law and are inconsistent with the notion of an
informal proceeding not requiring counsel. 56
4.

Recommendation

If the special master determines after the hearing that the development order or enforcement action is not unreasonable or does not unfairly burden the property, the recommendation must be that it
3 7
iJ'r~indi
r
S -jthoigb nor
ih furth
cdton or gcommendation
by the special master is required by the statute, the special master may
wish to submit proposals to the parties on the basis of information
produced at the hearing.
On the other hand, if the special master determines that the development order or enforcement action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the property, the special master may recommend "one or more
alternatives that protect the public interest served by the development
order or enforcement action" but reduce the burden on the property.3 58 Such a recommendation may be made only with the consent of
35 9
the landowner.
The Special Master Law suggests ten options which are to be considered in proposing relief for the landowner.)6 They include 1)an
adjustment of land development or permit standards controlling the
use of the land; 2) increases or modifications in the density, intensity,
or use of development areas; 3) transfer of development rights; 4)
land swaps or exchanges; 5) mitigation, including payments instead of
on-site mitigation; 6) location on the least sensitive portion of the

354. Id. § 70.51(17)(c).
.355. Id. §70.51(18)(h).
356. Id. § 70.51(17).
357. Id. § 70.51(19)(a).
358. Id. § 70.51(19)(b).
359. Id. § 70.51(19)(b). In light of the short time periods allowed by the statute, the special
master should ask the landowner to make this election at hearing in the event that a settlement is
not reached.
360. Id.
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property; 7) conditions on the amount of development or use permitted; 8) a requirement that issues be addressed more comprehensively
than the use or uses immediately proposed; 9) issuance of a development order, variance, special exception, or other form of extraordinary relief, including withdrawal of an enforcement action; or 10)
public purchase of the owner's property or acquisition of a less-thanfee-simple interest in it.61 The special master is not limited to propos-

ing only those remedial steps on the statutory menu.
5.

Effect of Recommendation

A determination that the development order or enforcement action
is unreasonable or an unfair burden on the owner's property may
serve as an "indication of sufficient hardship" for purposes of a variance, special exception, or other relief. 362 This effect of the recommendation is not dependent upon the governmental entity's response.
A special master's recommendation also may serve as data and
analysis to support a comprehensive plan amendment, but it alone will
not necessarily determine whether the amendment is in compliance as
defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.163 If an amendment to the local comprehensive plan is necessary to implement the
recommendation of a special master, the amendment will not be subject to the twice yearly limitation when a local government may adopt
plan amendments. 364 Further, the amendment may be adopted pursuant to the streamlined adoption process set forth in section
163.3184(16), Florida Statutes, to implement a comprehensive plan
compliance agreement.3 65
E.

Disposition of Recommendation

Upon receipt of a special master's recommendation, the governmental entity has several duties which are intended to bring the proceeding to a close, either by implementation of a settlement or official

361. Id. § 70.001(4)(c). This list of potential remedies is almost identical to the remedies
proposed for consideration by the governmental entity and the landowner under the Harris Act
during the 180-day notice period. Id. § 70.001(4)(c). See supranote 130 and accompanying text.

The special master's recommendation must be consistent with existing statutes, rules, regulations, and ordinances. See Dep't of Comm'y Aff., CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis 4 (May
15, 1995) (on file with Dept.).
362. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(25) (1995).
363. Id. § 70.51(26); see id. § 163.3184(l)(b).
364. Id. § 70.51(26).

365.

See id. § 163.3184(16).
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actions which are intended to ripen the controversy for judicial review. 36
1.

Consistency with Existing Law

Unlike the Harris Act, which authorizes a departure from the specific terms of existing laws so long as the departure is consistent with
the underlying statutory purpose, the resolution of a dispute through
the Special Master Law must be consistent with applicable growth
management and environmental protection laws. 67 The statute specifies that implementation of a settlement, whether as originally recommended by the special master or as subsequently modified by the
governmental entity, must be "in the ordinary course and consistent
with the rules and procedures of that governmental entity." 3 s This
limitation applies whether the disposition would involve implementation of a settlement or a recommendation by the special master in the
absence of a settlement. 69

2. Responsibility of GovernmentalEntity
Within forty-five days of receipt of a special master's recommendation, the governmental entity must confer with any other involved
government entities and either accept, modify, or reject the special
master's recommendation. 170 An acceptance or modification may be
implemented by development agreement or other action. 371 A failure

366. Id. § 70.51(21).
367. Compare id. § 70.001(4)(d) with id. § 70.51(21).
368. Id. § 70.51(21)(a)-(b). Thus, the governmental entity's ordinary procedural requirements would apply to implementation of a settlement. For example, if the dispute involved a
rezoning by a local government and the settlement called for an alteration of the rezoning action
by addition or deletion of a condition, a new development order would have to be adopted to
implement the settlement. That new development order would be subject to normal procedural
requirements. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
This aspect of the Special Master Law ensures that, prior to implementation of a settlement,
the general public as well as affected persons will have access to governmental decisionmakers,
and that the matter will receive appropriate scrutiny. Specifically, it assures the same amount of
due process that neighboring landowners or citizens' groups otherwise would receive and cures
any concerns regarding the flexibility or informality of either the mediation or informationgathering phases of the proceeding.
369. However, an owner need not "duplicate previous processes in which the owner has
participated in order to effectuate" a decision by the local government to grant a modification,
variance, or special exception as recommended by a special master. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(21)(a)
(1995).
370. Id. § 70.51(21). Within 15 days of its decision, the governmental entity must notify the
Florida Department of Legal Affairs of its disposition of the recommendation in writing. Id. §
70.51(27).
371. See Florida Local Government Development Agreement Act, id. §§ 163.3220-.3243.
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to act on the recommendation within forty-five days constitutes a rejection of the recommendation unless the landowner agrees to an extension.372
If the governmental entity accepts the recommendation or modification but the landowner rejects that action or if the governmental entity rejects the recommendation, within thirty days after such a
decision the governmental entity is required to issue a written decision
describing all uses available on the property.3 73 This action is intended
to ripen the owner's claim for purposes of judicial review. 7 4 Whether

or not the local government issues the written decision on uses, the
landowner may file a civil action as soon as the governmental entity
acts on the special master's recommendations. 3"
F.

Limitations

There are important limitations on the availability of a special mas76
ter proceeding. First, it is available only in as-applied challenges.1
Second, it is not available to an owner who contests an action of either state or local governmental entities regarding an amendment to a
local comprehensive plan.377 Third, it is available as of right only for

development orders or enforcement actions on or after October 1,
1995.378 Fourth, it is not intended to replace or supplant other lawfully
379
available ADR methods.

The special master proceeding may not last more than 165 days
without the consent of all parties. 8 0 Requesting a special master
proceeding is voluntary for the landowner and is not a condition precedent to any other legal proceeding. 8 '
G.

Summary

The Special Master Law is a hybrid which combines in a single expedited proceeding some of the attributes of other ADR methods,
372.

Id. § 70.51(21)(c).

373.

Id. § 70.51(22).

374. Id. § 70.51(23). It is described as "the last prerequisite to judicial action" unless the
owner initiates a proceeding under section 120.57, Florida Statutes, for agencies subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
375. Id. § 70.51(24).
376. Id. § 70.51(3).
377. Id. § 70.51 (2)(a); see infra notes 382-96 and accompanying text.
378. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(3) (1995). However, subject to approval of all parties and the court,
the statute allows parties to pending judicial proceedings to utilize the special master procedure
to address their dispute, although it does not provide a procedure for doing so. Id. § 70.51(30).
379. Id. § 70.51(29).
380. Id. § 70.51(23).
381. Id. § 70.51(24).
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such as mediation, arbitration, and mini-trials. While the Special Master Law is untested and may require legislative adjustments in the future, it is beyond question that this is a new body in the ADR
firmament.
V.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE

CHAPTER

163

PROGRAM

Because the Special Master Law expressly does not cover actions by
governmental entities relating to local comprehensive plans, 8

2

the

1995 property rights legislation creates separate ADR remedies for the
comprehensive planning process at both the local and state levels."' 3
The Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act 384 specifies the procedure for public participation in the comprehensive planning process on the local governmental
level.3 8 Prior to enactment of the new property rights law, there was
no state-specified administrative process for a landowner to take issue
with a local government's decision not to grant a plan amendment
Section 4 of the legislation requires a local government to provide an
opportunity for mediation or other form of ADR when it denies an
owner's request for an amendment to the local comprehensive plan. 8 6
The costs of the ADR will be shared equally by the local government
and the owner.3" 7 If the owner requests mediation, the time for bringing a judicial action will be tolled for 120 days or until completion of
the mediation, whichever is earlier. 8
The property rights law also creates a new ADR process available in
a compliance dispute between a landowner and the state land planning
agency, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). 8 9 Under
existing law, the DCA is required to forward to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) the agency's notice of intent to find a
local government's comprehensive plan amendment not in compliance
with state law. 39 The DOAH then is required to conduct a formal
fact-finding hearing in accordance with section 120.57(1), FloridaStatutes, with the parties specified to be the DCA, the local government,
and any affected person (such as the owner) who intervenes.*91
382.

Id. § 70.51(2)(a).

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

388.

Id.

389.
390.

Id. § 5.
Id. § 163.3184(10)(a).

391.

Id.

§§ 163.3181(4), .3184(10)(c).
ch. 163, pt. I.
§ 163.3181.
§ 163.3181(4).
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Section 5 requires the DCA to afford a prehearing opportunity to
mediate or otherwise resolve a dispute involving a notice of intent to
find a plan amendment not in compliance.3 9 If mediation is requested
by any party, the DCA must agree to mediation; the DOAH may not
conduct a hearing until the DCA has notified the hearing officer of
the results of the mediation.3 93 The hearing may not be delayed longer
than ninty days under this provision without the consent of the parties.394 Mediation costs will be borne equally by all parties to the proceeding.39
The ADR provisions integrated into Chapter 163 by the property
rights law are general. 396 Thus, local governments and the DCA have
broad latitude to choose, in conjunction with landowners and other
parties, the particular dispute resolution methods to be employed in
each case. This freedom should give parties to local planning disputes
the opportunity to develop case-specific dispute resolution processes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The 1995 property rights legislation was intended to adjust the balance between private interests and government in the continuing friction between regulators and landowners over the use of land in
Florida. It reflects both the popular mood and the shift in legislative
sentiment in recent years.
These new remedies are not radical departures from existing legal
doctrine. The Harris Act builds upon common law principles, constitutional decisions, and the tradition of finding an accommodation between public and private interests. The Special Master Law and
related mediation provisions for the local planning program draw on
the field of ADR to seek remedies short of the expensive and frustrating process of litigation. Together, these efforts represent an attempt
to provide new and measured relief for landowners without undermining Florida's landmark environmental protection and growth management laws.

392. Id. § 163.3184(10)(c).
393.

Id.

394. Id.
395. Id.
396.

Id. §§ 70.001, 70.51, 70.80, 163.3181(4), 163.3184(10)(c).

